In our presentation last week, Brittney and I began discussing how the previous chapter had outlined Charles Houston’s philosophy of leadership – namely, the important relationship between active litigation in the courts and active involvement in the community.  In this chapter we find Houston leaving his post at the NAACP in 1938 after seeing his vision being realized and passing the torch to Thurgood Marshall; it is important to note that Houston’s involvement with the organization did not come to a screeching halt at this point (249).  To me, this embodies a rare leadership quality which I think is important – knowing when your time is up in a specific position without abandoning your commitment to your vision.

We also see how the structure of the NAACP began to undergo some changes as a discussion of how to properly incorporate the national branches was taken into consideration and slightly more emphasis was placed on field work – as evidenced by the importance of Ella Baker.  The discussion of the future of the NAACP during such an uneasy time – financial constraints as well as continued political constraints – had an emphasis on the localization of the struggle.  As we discussed when reading Barbara Ransby’s book on Ella Baker, Baker’s philosophy of leadership and social change was based in grass roots organizing and focusing on allowing communities to combat their struggles.  The analysis offered by Robin D.G. Kelley in “We Are Not What We Seem” speaks to the emphasis of localization.  In order to combat the politics of oppression it is important to consider the everyday, seemingly insignificant forms of resistance which may not have been groundbreaking protests but are in themselves politically important.

Two take away phrases from this set of readings are as they appear in the title of this post, “local” and “personal”.   I think it’s important for social movement organizations to consider the power that lies within local issues and personal struggles to ultimately bolster the overall vision for change.

Here are some questions I would like to offer for consideration:

• What do you make of Houston’s decision to depart from his
  position in the NAACP in 1938? Do you think it is important for leaders in
  social movement organizations to know when to “pass on the torch”?
• How do you interpret the description of Ella Baker’s early
  work in the NAACP in this book as it is contextualized within the examination
  of organization’s history? Do you find any similarities or differences from
  what we read in Barbara Ransby’s book?
• Considering the frame of Robin D.G. Kelley’s article,
  do you think that the personal can be political? If so, can you think of any
  other examples of such in other social movements we have or have not discussed
  in class?

What I enjoyed most about Robin D. G. Kelley’s article “‘We Are Not What We Seem:’ Rethinking Black Working Class Opposition in the Jim Crow South,” was that it brought an unexpected and refreshing new angle to the world of social movements. I was beginning to think of social movements as a game between institutions and organizations. Those in power would make their move, and then those who had organized to fight the power would make another move to influence the next move made. Kelley radically redefined that by showing me that while coalitions are undoubtedly important, they do not have to be made quite as consciously as I previously thought. They can form organically through friendships, community, and culture.

This approach I believe more effectively acknowledges the earlier constraints on social movement by African Americans. As Kelley points out, “when thinking about the Jim Crow South, we need always to keep in mind that African Americans, the working class in particular, did not experience a liberal democracy.” (110) This means that working with the institutions of power was not an option, at least not initially.

African Americans who did not have even the most remote access to power created their own power through civil disobedience and deviance. This was displayed particularly in the work place. Black men and women created a defiant culture by working together to control the pace of work in exploitive working conditions. Black women were subjected not only to racism by white male employers, but also to sexism, and supported each other through creating “networks of solidarity” (98). Public space also functioned as a forum for expression of frustration with race relations, especially public transportation. Individuals began to protest racism in the public transportation before it ever became an issue for social movement organizations like the NAACP. The people set the agenda for what to change, not the institutions.

While organization and structure are undoubtedly important to the progression of a social movement, I appreciated how this article put the power of social movements back into the hands of individuals. It recognized the importance why the movement started and not how it moved. Why the movement started undoubtedly frames how it plays out, and I appreciated Kelley’s emphasis on where the unrest unfolded and how resistance organically materialized from that.

Again, however, I think the most important takeaway from this article is that individual African Americans made their own power through civil disobedience in the workplace and in public spaces (although still within a strong community with communal purpose). The “unorganized, seemingly powerless black working people brought these issues to the forefront by their resistance, which was shaped by relations of domination as well as the many confrontations they witnessed on the stage of the moving theater” of public transportation (109). Without these rebellious individuals to create a culture of protest, even on a small scale, could organizations like the NAACP even begin? In the end, which is more important: the protest culture or the protesting coalition?

The implementation of the New Deal by the newly elected president Franklin D. Roosevelt marked a pivotal turn in the fight for African American rights. After a long and arduous struggle attempting to infiltrate both the federal and state governments, African Americans were finally making measurable progress. Racial caste systems still dominated Congress but with the determination of the NAACP, inspiration from the New Deal, and the individual efforts of many such as Charles Houston, Walter White, and Thurgood Marshall new reformations were made. The NAACP decided to take economic and employment issues into their own hands and developed both acts and groups such as the National Industry Recovery Act and National Recovery Administration (NRA) to ensure black representation in social reforms (192). Anti-lynching reform continued to be an integral part of the NAACP’s policy agenda. With the help of newly trained African American lawyers as discussed in Chapter 5, anti-lynching proposals flooded the courts.

Mounting tension between White and Du Bois eventually resulted in Du Bois’ resignation from the NAACP. They disagreed on issues such as voluntary segregation and neither party was budging. White argued that accepting any form of voluntary segregation would completely undermine the NAACP’s mission to help foster a harmonious and racially intermixed country (200). Throughout the history of the NAACP, fieldwork had been an essential part of the organizations base, and headquarters continued to emphasis the importance of local branches involvement in local reformation (205).

The reason why the NAACP was so “successful” despite the Depression was due to the emphasis placed on training and incorporating African American lawyers into the core of the NAACP as well as support from the New Deal. The process of teaching blacks to become lawyers and then hiring them as their representatives in court cases was a huge boost to the NAACP’s reputation and legitimacy. Despite the New Deal having various racist restrictions, funding was still provided to African Americans institutions and inspired many groups such as the NAACP to develop their own forms of reconstruction (226). I use the word successful in quotations because the term is relative. The NAACP may not have accomplished their broader goals in Chapter 6, but they did win minor battles while on their way to tackling those larger issues.

How important is it for long-term organizations to adapt to the demands of changing times? Do you think W.E.B. Du Bois’ greatest fault was his inability to accept the growing need to intermingle with different races? Or was he just in his thinking that in order for African Americans to succeed, they must fully rely on themselves and their own race?

(Shout out to Ella Baker on page 243)

Lucie Dufour

In Charles Houston’s Article, “Education Inequalities Must Go”, we see a definitive action plan to solve educational inequalities, instated by the N.A.A.C.P. Although I appreciated this concrete and unwavering plan, the part that I found most valuable to their argument is when he touches on this philosophical idea of human existence and how we all wish to be treated with respect and equality. When he states “To the N.A.A.C.P ‘amicable race relations’ means mutual helpfulness in promoting the common welfare allowing to everybody concerned the full benefit of the law and equality of opportunity.” In the statement following he says it is not “whether the whites and Negroes can remain friends while the Negro is at the little end of the horn”. Right here Houston has posed a great challenge to all races of America. He is making a statement about humankind and how we all need to treat one another equally because we are all humans and want the same thing. Inclusion, respect, we are social beings after all. Personally, I don’t think that stating your action plan is going to intimidate of change the whites in power as much as this statement which almost digs at all human feelings. It can be understood by all and really causes people to think and reflect on their actions and test if they are truly acting, as they would want to be treated.

I also found interesting how much the circumstances of our presidents changed the course of the civil rights movement. In another leadership class we have read numerous books by Malcolm Gladwell. One of his books, titled The Tipping Point examines those little instances that change a situation dramatically. I think this truly occurred in the context of the Civil Rights Movement when FDR became president. His presidency began a domino effect of positive changes towards solving the social injustices of African Americans. The Joint Committee on National Recovery also dramatically changed the course of the civil rights movement. Finally, the concert at the Lincoln Memorial and Eleanor Roosevelt’s resignation from the DAR, demonstrate the constantly changing mindset of the nation at the time.

A few questions to reflect upon:

1. What are other examples of “tipping point” like situations that have occurred during the Civil Rights Movements?

2. Without people like the Roosevelts would the civil rights movement have gained so much momentum as quickly? Would they have attained goals?

3. Did you find Houston’s article statement on humanity as moving? Do you think it changed the mentalities of whites in Virginia at the time?

– Eliza McLean

After reading the article Educational Inequalities Must Go! and the short film by Charles Houston, I find it interesting that in both accounts Houston uses the laws and constitution of the U.S. to show how much the American government on a local level, is ignoring its own laws and policies. The article in particular presents a new plan put on by the NAACP to figure out a way that can help to eliminate all inequalities for education of whites and blacks.

One of my critiques of the article is that it seems to be focusing on higher education as it mentions the two cases of black students and their admittance into graduate school. My only problem with this is that for these two students to make it to the graduate level, they must have been privileged in order to make it that far in their schooling. As shown in Sullivan’s book, Houston was interested in educating other black men to become lawyers. However, in order to raise the standards of education across the board, I believe it to be necessary to work at the local levels in elementary schools in order for all children to have an equal education. Houston certainly mentions this method as well in his articles and short film, but I think more could have been done right away with policy changes.

The plan that Houston and the N.A.A.C.P. laid out to equalize education was one that we have not seen a great deal of in our studies so far in this class. That is they sought to “insist that the U.S. respect its own Constitution and its own laws” (The Crisis). At a time when African-Americans were placed into categories based on their looks, this was an excellent way in which they could have legitimacy in the American legal system. There could not be any denial of the law and this was a beneficial method for the N.A.A.C.P. in order to reach their goal of educational equality.

Here are a few questions I have:

1. In what ways are W.E.B. DuBois and Houston’s goals relatable to one another?

2. Based on our discussions in class, what other ways could the N.A.A.C.P. and Houston approached educational inequality in America?

-Kate Fleischer

The chapter was a bit choppy in my opinion, so I’ll do my best to discuss what I thought were the major points. Myers uses chapter 9 to discuss the complex and multi-dimensional relationship between social movements and public policy. Myers outlines how public policy can be both a cause and response to social movement. The examples Myers juxtaposes to illustrate this point are the expansion of the draft during the Vietnam War and the distribution of benefits as a result of the Bonus March following WWI. The expansion of the draft played a pivotal role in inciting the anti-war movement. Myers uses this example to generalize that “changes in policy provide the concerns that drive people into mobilization” (171). The distribution of benefits to veterans returning from the war was the culmination of the Bonus March and years of protesting for well fare. This example is used to demonstrate how the policy process “responds to social movement” (171). The key point Myers tries to make is that public policy influences social movements, and social movements influence public policy.

Myers dives deeper into how social movement effects policy by describing four ways in which social movements alter policy networks. In summation, social movements can

1. Lead to the replacement of existing political figures, meaning “throwing a rascal out and putting and ally in office instead” (173).
2. Lead to the conversion of beliefs where existing political figures change their beliefs on policy to benefit the movement
3. Lead to the creation of a completely new policy area, agency, habit, or institutional setting
4. Lead to the reconfiguration of current policy monopolies by introducing to new individuals to them

The key question I asked myself when I was reading all of this was whether policy should even be the desired outcome of social movement. Myers briefly hints at this at one point in the chapter on page 170, but I wish that he had explored this issue more. History has shown that public policy is not always capable of achieving societal change. The Emancipation Proclamation is just one of many policies in our country’s history that epitomize the principle that policy cannot change hearts. In order for policy to have its desired effect the mindsets and values of those it affects have to change as well. Therefore, the most important outcome of social movement is not one of the aforementioned changes to the policy networks, but rather changes in societal values and beliefs. I feel that this aspect of social movements is often ignored in favor of striving for direct policy changes.

What are all of your opinions on this issue? Am I downplaying the power that policy changes can have or is changing public values and opinions as important as I think? I feel as if I would be remiss in my blog duties if I didn’t mention OWS, so do you guys think that the OWS movement needs to change public opinions on wealth distribution in order to accomplish its broad goals?

The Bonus Marchers' camp outside Washington D.C.

In Chapter 9 Meyer opens with the example of the Bonus Marchers of 1932, which I find particularly interesting being a member of Army ROTC. The basic idea behind the Bonus Marchers was for WWI veterans march to Washington D.C. and persuade the government to give them their monetary bonus for serving in the war immediately, instead of waiting till 1945, when it was originally scheduled to be paid. Their “Bonus Bill” was shot down in 1932, but in 1933 when Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president, they returned to protest again. Finally, by 1936 the Bonus Marchers’ continual protest was rewarded as Roosevelt agreed to pay the bonus ahead of schedule.

There are two things that I’d like to highlight in this story. First, that protest can affect policy. This is the theme of this chapter in looking at how exactly this happens. Second, this is an example of a social movement that fully achieved their goal. Unlike many of the social movements that we’ve looked at so far, the Bonus Marchers actually accomplished what they set out to do, and when they finished, they disbanded and went home. This will become important later on in this post.

Let’s look at the first topic, how exactly can protests affect policy? Meyer seems to point to a few different reasons, all leading up to the fact that in order to change policy, social movements have to go through the government in order to get their reforms enacted. Meyer talks about how the Bonus Marchers had contacts in government, and how they had their “Bonus Bill” heard in congress. But ultimately, everything has to go through government. Protests serve to gain attention, to spread the concerns to a wider audience, and then, once enough people are upset, the politicians have to do something about it.

Now why does this matter? What do we care that hundreds of people are camping out in Washington D.C. for a bonus that they’ll get paid eventually anyway? Meyer says that “When a mobilized effort demonstrates strength and commitment, it can make the current policy course untenable or make long-simmering ideas appear suddenly viable” (Meyer, 172). When enough people are upset it looks poorly for those in command. President Hoover had to explain why he didn’t favor helping the veterans when there was an unemployment problem already. The key seems to be numbers and persistence.

Finally, another way that I thought was key to this issue, and wasn’t really talked about very much in the chapter, was the fact that the Bonus Marchers had an achievable goal. It seems common sense that if you want to achieve your goal, you want to make your goal achievable. This is how I would critique some of the movements that just strive for “social equality” or to even out the wage dispersion like OWS wants. How is one ever going to fully achieve social equality? Or how can we ever make everyone have exactly equal pay? It just seems that sometimes smaller goals can get heard and made into policy more than the larger ones.

I’ve said a lot in this post that was hopefully provocative in some way. If you agree or disagree, please let me know by commenting. Thanks!

In Chapter 9, entitled “The Policy Connection,” Meyer describes the reciprocal relationship of policy and protest. He showed how activists respond to government policy in many situations, and inversely how policy addresses the disruption that mobilization causes in others.The two examples he used to demonstrate both sides of the democratic connection between policy and protest were the Bonus Bill movement and the antiwar movement against Vietnam.

The Bonus March movement involved a series of marches and demonstrations from veterans who had been displaced from World War I. They were desperate for work and the government had only promised a measly $1,000 service bonus to each of them. The Veterans were fighting to pass a bill called the Bonus Bill which would offer them much more money and support. When the veterans’ encampment and marches failed to convince government to pass the bill, the marchers extended their cause to a wider audience to include many more people who were in need. When relief for more people became the focus, and the movement grew larger and unavoidable, Roosevelt eventually passed the bill in response to their grievances. This is a fine example of policy responding to protest. In the other example, the antiwar movement in the 1960s, the movement was a direct response to policy that was passed. There had already been growing hatred for Nixon’s use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, but after he passed a policy which extended the draft to eighteen-year-olds, a new movement erupted. This example shows the other side of the relationship in which a group was given a reason to join other groups who already opposed the war; it was protest in response to policy.

In this chapter, Meyer asserted that changes in policy are usually incremental by way of marginal adjustments. So, although he has given instances in which policy has changed due to protest, the outcome is certainly not always in the favor of the activists. Not only is policy change too slow to be satisfactory to the urgent concerns of activists, but it often does not change enough to accomplish the end goals of the movement. He had an interesting quote saying, “There is a mismatch between political rhetoric that emphasizes absolutes and a political process that prizes compromise and incrementalism” (Meyer 177). Our governmental system will never meet all the expectations and address all the grievances of a movement, so people will always experience some sort of disappointment. This reminded me of Barbara Ransby at her lecture about MLK Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement. She said that if Ella Baker and MLK Jr. were here today, they would be pleased with progress, but they would not feel like their goals had been reached. There is always more work to be done.

“At what point can movements claim victory? Is there ever at point at which they can say that they have won, even when there is always more work to be done? Even if policy does not change in response to a movement, can the visibility of new issues be enough to satisfy the constituents?”