Author Archives: vt6as

Invisible Barriers and Pure Intentions (Chapter 9)

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In Chapter 9, Sullivan makes his readers painfully aware of the constant yet slow movement forward to desegregation in the South. He points out that even twenty years after DuBois has “called for ‘a crusade’ against the wretched state of black education in the South and more than a decade since Charles Houston offered his stark visual documentation of separate and equal schools in South Carolina.” Yet, “conditions through most of the South had remained unchanged” (334). What are some of the reasons that desegregation was thwarted? Was it just on the parts of the whites? OR was the mindset of the blacks also a barrier for advancement; “For many southern blacks, the idea of school integration was abstract at best, given the weight of history and the realities of race and power in the South” (334).

Something that was also touched on in class but I think deserves some more attention is the obvious bond that Thurgood Marshall has with the South. He had tried cases in every southern state and had a deep connection to “southern life built up during a decade of work and travel”, especially since Marshall “often stayed in private homes, given the scarcity of decent hotels for blacks in the South”. It is interesting to see the amount of personal dedication and time that Marshall had given to the cause and the NAACP movement. And even though we brought up in class that he would choose cases that would often not pay him much or have any guarantee of success, but cases that had a high probability of being brought to the national level. And I know we all love Thurgood Marshall, but could it be that his intentions were not truly pure and he was not completely the hero that negative we paint him out to be, but a lawyer looking for fame and recognition? Maybe it is the connotations that lawyers carry nowadays that has me being slightly skeptical.

Furthermore, as we look at what we have read in class, it is interesting to see the difference of Presidential backing of the NAACP as time progresses. FDR was reluctant to be outspokenly in favor of White and the NAACP’s goals, however, because “the power of the black vote in key northern states” provided President Truman with enough political incentive to include “civil rights as a top item on his domestic agenda for 1948 in his State of Union address (353). As mentioned in class, we see how the black vote has gained power or on the flip side, stricken fear into the hearts of white politicians as they tried to secure their power through gerrymandering. Do you think that Truman would have also supported the NAACP so avidly in the “face of his party’s powerful southern bloc” even if he had been president during FDR’s time? OR do you think that the “perfect storm of political developments made it highly possible that black voters would determine the outcome of the presidential election” forced Truman to take a stand? (356).

Personally I think that it is difficult to break out of the cycle of oppression and poor education and that is why it is so difficult to push for desegregation. The educated African American community understands how education is a means for advancement and the only way to break the cycle, but those that have not been fortunate enough to possess this knowledge may be allowing fear and anger to stop them for seeking the integration of schools. Furthermore, I by no means want to tear Truman and Marshall’s actions down from the high regards they are now held at, but just to play devil’s advocate, it’s easy for us to look back and history and say, these men acted this way with pure intentions since it could be that they just took a gamble and it turned out in their favor. We will never know, but I’m interested in what you all think!

Chapter 7: Playing Within the Rules of the Game vs. The Consequences of Challenging the System

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In Meyer’s Chapter 7, we see him address not only the process of institutionalization but also the effects that it has on the different factions of a broad social movement. He suggests that these three complementary processes are cooptation, marginalization, and demobilization.

The first brings the one part of the faction to move into institutional politics as it moves from beyond the “borders of mainstream politics to the inside of the political arena” (130). We see this kind of association within social movements today as they try to gain momentum by playing within the rules of the already existing game. In this way, they can establish themselves “legitimately” as they follow the rules, routines, procedures, and norms of mainstream politics. Many new movements are vulnerable to cooptation as it is the safer route to take as they set their prospective achievements being attained in smaller steps as they have to follow all the red tape and rules that has already been established.

The second process is for groups that have been forced outside mainstream politics and their culture has been marginalized. A way that this can be achieved is through repression and forcible exclusion; however, this is sometimes a good thing for groups as they have no one to compromise their stances on their issues of concerns. This can be compared to how we see political candidates compromising their pure stances to nourish internal relationships and appease their constituents. If the groups aren’t worried about gaining access to larger audiences, then this process is actually allowing them to “speak their truths as clearly as possible, albeit to smaller audiences” (Taylor 1989). But we can see this kind of marginalization in our government’s history as social movement leaders of the 1880s onward have been threatened by secret police and sometimes sentenced to extended prison terms for exercising their right to express their opinions that just happened to be different than those of mainstream politics.

Lastly, sometimes when issues lose the spotlight and attention of mainstream politics, their supports and activists demobilize. However, as we talked about in class and as we read in Chapter 3, we know that there are movement professionals who don’t necessarily protest visibly on the streets everyday or rally the troops to sustain the movement, but are quietly and less visibly supporting their cause while sustaining a more career-oriented lifestyle. Although there are some movements who fall of the map as their supports demobilize there are many more that take what they have learned from the experience and pursue other more focused protests. For example, many movements include multiple factions that recognize that it is mutually beneficial to be seen as a one movement, but when the broad movement is demobilized, many individuals “turn their attention to other issues that now seem more pressing, more promising, or more in line with their core mission” (131). Meyers gives the example of the nuclear freeze movement that included multiple different groups, and when the movement faded, these groups didn’t just stop supporting their causes, but instead they turned their attention to their narrower focuses that held them together.

And so as I was reading, I was wondering what you guys thought are the “worst” or “best” fates of movements as they fall into the processes of institutionalization. Personally, I don’t necessarily think that it is a bad thing when super large groups demobilize after becoming marginalized because I think that in many scenarios, politics deludes the true intentions of groups and a reorganization of people with the same core mission once in awhile is a good thing.

Furthermore, I think that Meyers brings up an interesting point of how when these three wings develop in a movement and for example, the institutionalized wing looses momentum, the other two wings become less interested to stay strong as well. Do you guys think that factions are the reasons that movements fail? Or do you think that factions are what truly focus a movement? Do you think the factions of the Occupy Wall Street Movement will help or destroy its momentum?