“The problem with Truman… was that he ‘thought he could carry on the fight for civil rights and still keep almost everybody happy.’ ” Sullivan, p.359

The above quote really caught my eye in the middle of Chapter 9, and so I’d like to focus on this idea of a presidential ally within a movement. Everything up to this point seemed to be extolling President Truman; Charles Houston, Walter White, and the majority of the NAACP were all behind him. So how could having the President of the United States on your side actually become a problem? 

This makes me think of the issue in a little different light. It seems to me that the NAACP had been pushing to get more and more elected officials on their side for a long time, and Truman is really seen as the first president who is strongly behind the NAACP. The chapter talks about how he gives special addresses to Congress on the issue of civil rights, he ranked civil rights among the top ten issues facing the United States in his presidential address, and was in nearly every way in favor of the NAACP and it’s civil rights movement. 

So on what grounds is the opening quotation made? Could it be that at some point an “ideal ally” loses his touch? Or is it all politics that gets the better of him with the election coming closer? Or is it that he tried to move to fast, and that’s why his agenda for the civil rights movement stalled out?
For the sake of controversy and good discussion I have my own opinions. I think that President Truman tried to do too much; I think he took ownership of the civil rights movement in a way that made him move forward farther than the NAACP was prepared to do at the time, possibly even making them look worse because of his stalled agenda.
Thoughts?

The Bonus Marchers' camp outside Washington D.C.

In Chapter 9 Meyer opens with the example of the Bonus Marchers of 1932, which I find particularly interesting being a member of Army ROTC. The basic idea behind the Bonus Marchers was for WWI veterans march to Washington D.C. and persuade the government to give them their monetary bonus for serving in the war immediately, instead of waiting till 1945, when it was originally scheduled to be paid. Their “Bonus Bill” was shot down in 1932, but in 1933 when Franklin Delano Roosevelt became president, they returned to protest again. Finally, by 1936 the Bonus Marchers’ continual protest was rewarded as Roosevelt agreed to pay the bonus ahead of schedule.

There are two things that I’d like to highlight in this story. First, that protest can affect policy. This is the theme of this chapter in looking at how exactly this happens. Second, this is an example of a social movement that fully achieved their goal. Unlike many of the social movements that we’ve looked at so far, the Bonus Marchers actually accomplished what they set out to do, and when they finished, they disbanded and went home. This will become important later on in this post.

Let’s look at the first topic, how exactly can protests affect policy? Meyer seems to point to a few different reasons, all leading up to the fact that in order to change policy, social movements have to go through the government in order to get their reforms enacted. Meyer talks about how the Bonus Marchers had contacts in government, and how they had their “Bonus Bill” heard in congress. But ultimately, everything has to go through government. Protests serve to gain attention, to spread the concerns to a wider audience, and then, once enough people are upset, the politicians have to do something about it.

Now why does this matter? What do we care that hundreds of people are camping out in Washington D.C. for a bonus that they’ll get paid eventually anyway? Meyer says that “When a mobilized effort demonstrates strength and commitment, it can make the current policy course untenable or make long-simmering ideas appear suddenly viable” (Meyer, 172). When enough people are upset it looks poorly for those in command. President Hoover had to explain why he didn’t favor helping the veterans when there was an unemployment problem already. The key seems to be numbers and persistence.

Finally, another way that I thought was key to this issue, and wasn’t really talked about very much in the chapter, was the fact that the Bonus Marchers had an achievable goal. It seems common sense that if you want to achieve your goal, you want to make your goal achievable. This is how I would critique some of the movements that just strive for “social equality” or to even out the wage dispersion like OWS wants. How is one ever going to fully achieve social equality? Or how can we ever make everyone have exactly equal pay? It just seems that sometimes smaller goals can get heard and made into policy more than the larger ones.

I’ve said a lot in this post that was hopefully provocative in some way. If you agree or disagree, please let me know by commenting. Thanks!