In October 1947, President Truman released “To Secure These Rights” reporting how America’s color line at mid-century negatively impacted all phases of life from housing and education to voting and international relations. The report appealed to a wide audience and finally brought the problem of the Negro and other minority groups into the public eye sparking a massive national discussion of civil rights. Truman promised a government-led campaign to wipe out segregation and even listed civil rights as the “top item on his domestic agenda for 1948” (353). I often tend to think that Presidential actions of this sort are simply appeasement in efforts to get re-elected. But after his continual attempt to address messages to Congress and even the NAACP and his efforts to pass bills, I started to genuinely believe him. Did you? I seemed to wonder that after the disappointment of FDR’s efforts, how could the African American community (especially the NAACP which seemed to support him wholeheartedly) trust Truman to actually enact the program? Did they have a choice? How can our electoral system ever change in the sense that politicians continually promise certain programs, but fail to actually make such changes? Or do we expect this failure to actually do as they said accepting it as an inherent characteristic of campaigning? If the answer this last question is yes, then this is a major problem that our system should be challenging more closely. I also found it interesting that despite his long standing commitment to racial equality and justice that the NAACP wasn’t really backing the Henry Wallace campaign. Sullivan notes how essential it was that “public displays of loyalty [to Truman] by the association’s top leadership were especially meaningful during a closely contested election” (360). Interestingly, Wallace’s candidacy effectively pressured Truman and the Democrats to move quicker towards action on civil rights (361). If it weren’t for Wallace, might Truman have never moved along with the programs? I was also pretty surprised that Truman still succeeded despite his avoidance of the South during the presidential race.

It’s important to note also how the NAACP effectively formed what I would call a “spirit of collective identity” and continued to be a source of hope and leadership for Negroes who believed that securing these rights would be impossible against such strong opposition and violence. As Palmer Weber wrote Marshall “I find the Negro leadership everywhere fighting for the ballot as ever before” (362). The NAACP, especially with the help of Marshall, Baker, Houston and other field workers, helped Negroes gain confidence through education that their voices could be heard if they worked hard enough. These leaders valued spending time in the communities most affected and effectively using their personalities to learn more about them. Such practice was similar to those mentioned with Brownie Lee Jones and the Southern School for Workers in Virginia throughout the 1940s where Jones was “the driving energy of the organization” despite the financial hardships faced by the organization. Similarly, Jones believed that “increasing citizenship responsibility as a fundamental part of any educational program” was essential to success (110). As a result, Jones’ helped strengthened political activism in black communities through interracial, working-class coalitions to challenge the power of the southern democrats and the whole American racial caste system. Another idea which is really interesting to me both by the NAACP and The Southern School is the notion that leaders can be trained. What do we think about this?

Another thing I also found interesting was the drama that arose after White divorced his wife for a white woman where people questioned his racial allegiance. This begs the question, how can a leader’s personal life affect the organization or the movement as a whole? Or does it not affect it at all?