“The problem with Truman… was that he ‘thought he could carry on the fight for civil rights and still keep almost everybody happy.’ ” Sullivan, p.359

The above quote really caught my eye in the middle of Chapter 9, and so I’d like to focus on this idea of a presidential ally within a movement. Everything up to this point seemed to be extolling President Truman; Charles Houston, Walter White, and the majority of the NAACP were all behind him. So how could having the President of the United States on your side actually become a problem? 

This makes me think of the issue in a little different light. It seems to me that the NAACP had been pushing to get more and more elected officials on their side for a long time, and Truman is really seen as the first president who is strongly behind the NAACP. The chapter talks about how he gives special addresses to Congress on the issue of civil rights, he ranked civil rights among the top ten issues facing the United States in his presidential address, and was in nearly every way in favor of the NAACP and it’s civil rights movement. 

So on what grounds is the opening quotation made? Could it be that at some point an “ideal ally” loses his touch? Or is it all politics that gets the better of him with the election coming closer? Or is it that he tried to move to fast, and that’s why his agenda for the civil rights movement stalled out?
For the sake of controversy and good discussion I have my own opinions. I think that President Truman tried to do too much; I think he took ownership of the civil rights movement in a way that made him move forward farther than the NAACP was prepared to do at the time, possibly even making them look worse because of his stalled agenda.
Thoughts?

In October 1947, President Truman released “To Secure These Rights” reporting how America’s color line at mid-century negatively impacted all phases of life from housing and education to voting and international relations. The report appealed to a wide audience and finally brought the problem of the Negro and other minority groups into the public eye sparking a massive national discussion of civil rights. Truman promised a government-led campaign to wipe out segregation and even listed civil rights as the “top item on his domestic agenda for 1948” (353). I often tend to think that Presidential actions of this sort are simply appeasement in efforts to get re-elected. But after his continual attempt to address messages to Congress and even the NAACP and his efforts to pass bills, I started to genuinely believe him. Did you? I seemed to wonder that after the disappointment of FDR’s efforts, how could the African American community (especially the NAACP which seemed to support him wholeheartedly) trust Truman to actually enact the program? Did they have a choice? How can our electoral system ever change in the sense that politicians continually promise certain programs, but fail to actually make such changes? Or do we expect this failure to actually do as they said accepting it as an inherent characteristic of campaigning? If the answer this last question is yes, then this is a major problem that our system should be challenging more closely. I also found it interesting that despite his long standing commitment to racial equality and justice that the NAACP wasn’t really backing the Henry Wallace campaign. Sullivan notes how essential it was that “public displays of loyalty [to Truman] by the association’s top leadership were especially meaningful during a closely contested election” (360). Interestingly, Wallace’s candidacy effectively pressured Truman and the Democrats to move quicker towards action on civil rights (361). If it weren’t for Wallace, might Truman have never moved along with the programs? I was also pretty surprised that Truman still succeeded despite his avoidance of the South during the presidential race.

It’s important to note also how the NAACP effectively formed what I would call a “spirit of collective identity” and continued to be a source of hope and leadership for Negroes who believed that securing these rights would be impossible against such strong opposition and violence. As Palmer Weber wrote Marshall “I find the Negro leadership everywhere fighting for the ballot as ever before” (362). The NAACP, especially with the help of Marshall, Baker, Houston and other field workers, helped Negroes gain confidence through education that their voices could be heard if they worked hard enough. These leaders valued spending time in the communities most affected and effectively using their personalities to learn more about them. Such practice was similar to those mentioned with Brownie Lee Jones and the Southern School for Workers in Virginia throughout the 1940s where Jones was “the driving energy of the organization” despite the financial hardships faced by the organization. Similarly, Jones believed that “increasing citizenship responsibility as a fundamental part of any educational program” was essential to success (110). As a result, Jones’ helped strengthened political activism in black communities through interracial, working-class coalitions to challenge the power of the southern democrats and the whole American racial caste system. Another idea which is really interesting to me both by the NAACP and The Southern School is the notion that leaders can be trained. What do we think about this?

Another thing I also found interesting was the drama that arose after White divorced his wife for a white woman where people questioned his racial allegiance. This begs the question, how can a leader’s personal life affect the organization or the movement as a whole? Or does it not affect it at all?

In Chapter 9, Sullivan makes his readers painfully aware of the constant yet slow movement forward to desegregation in the South. He points out that even twenty years after DuBois has “called for ‘a crusade’ against the wretched state of black education in the South and more than a decade since Charles Houston offered his stark visual documentation of separate and equal schools in South Carolina.” Yet, “conditions through most of the South had remained unchanged” (334). What are some of the reasons that desegregation was thwarted? Was it just on the parts of the whites? OR was the mindset of the blacks also a barrier for advancement; “For many southern blacks, the idea of school integration was abstract at best, given the weight of history and the realities of race and power in the South” (334).

Something that was also touched on in class but I think deserves some more attention is the obvious bond that Thurgood Marshall has with the South. He had tried cases in every southern state and had a deep connection to “southern life built up during a decade of work and travel”, especially since Marshall “often stayed in private homes, given the scarcity of decent hotels for blacks in the South”. It is interesting to see the amount of personal dedication and time that Marshall had given to the cause and the NAACP movement. And even though we brought up in class that he would choose cases that would often not pay him much or have any guarantee of success, but cases that had a high probability of being brought to the national level. And I know we all love Thurgood Marshall, but could it be that his intentions were not truly pure and he was not completely the hero that negative we paint him out to be, but a lawyer looking for fame and recognition? Maybe it is the connotations that lawyers carry nowadays that has me being slightly skeptical.

Furthermore, as we look at what we have read in class, it is interesting to see the difference of Presidential backing of the NAACP as time progresses. FDR was reluctant to be outspokenly in favor of White and the NAACP’s goals, however, because “the power of the black vote in key northern states” provided President Truman with enough political incentive to include “civil rights as a top item on his domestic agenda for 1948 in his State of Union address (353). As mentioned in class, we see how the black vote has gained power or on the flip side, stricken fear into the hearts of white politicians as they tried to secure their power through gerrymandering. Do you think that Truman would have also supported the NAACP so avidly in the “face of his party’s powerful southern bloc” even if he had been president during FDR’s time? OR do you think that the “perfect storm of political developments made it highly possible that black voters would determine the outcome of the presidential election” forced Truman to take a stand? (356).

Personally I think that it is difficult to break out of the cycle of oppression and poor education and that is why it is so difficult to push for desegregation. The educated African American community understands how education is a means for advancement and the only way to break the cycle, but those that have not been fortunate enough to possess this knowledge may be allowing fear and anger to stop them for seeking the integration of schools. Furthermore, I by no means want to tear Truman and Marshall’s actions down from the high regards they are now held at, but just to play devil’s advocate, it’s easy for us to look back and history and say, these men acted this way with pure intentions since it could be that they just took a gamble and it turned out in their favor. We will never know, but I’m interested in what you all think!