In Meyer’s Chapter 7, we see him address not only the process of institutionalization but also the effects that it has on the different factions of a broad social movement. He suggests that these three complementary processes are cooptation, marginalization, and demobilization.

The first brings the one part of the faction to move into institutional politics as it moves from beyond the “borders of mainstream politics to the inside of the political arena” (130). We see this kind of association within social movements today as they try to gain momentum by playing within the rules of the already existing game. In this way, they can establish themselves “legitimately” as they follow the rules, routines, procedures, and norms of mainstream politics. Many new movements are vulnerable to cooptation as it is the safer route to take as they set their prospective achievements being attained in smaller steps as they have to follow all the red tape and rules that has already been established.

The second process is for groups that have been forced outside mainstream politics and their culture has been marginalized. A way that this can be achieved is through repression and forcible exclusion; however, this is sometimes a good thing for groups as they have no one to compromise their stances on their issues of concerns. This can be compared to how we see political candidates compromising their pure stances to nourish internal relationships and appease their constituents. If the groups aren’t worried about gaining access to larger audiences, then this process is actually allowing them to “speak their truths as clearly as possible, albeit to smaller audiences” (Taylor 1989). But we can see this kind of marginalization in our government’s history as social movement leaders of the 1880s onward have been threatened by secret police and sometimes sentenced to extended prison terms for exercising their right to express their opinions that just happened to be different than those of mainstream politics.

Lastly, sometimes when issues lose the spotlight and attention of mainstream politics, their supports and activists demobilize. However, as we talked about in class and as we read in Chapter 3, we know that there are movement professionals who don’t necessarily protest visibly on the streets everyday or rally the troops to sustain the movement, but are quietly and less visibly supporting their cause while sustaining a more career-oriented lifestyle. Although there are some movements who fall of the map as their supports demobilize there are many more that take what they have learned from the experience and pursue other more focused protests. For example, many movements include multiple factions that recognize that it is mutually beneficial to be seen as a one movement, but when the broad movement is demobilized, many individuals “turn their attention to other issues that now seem more pressing, more promising, or more in line with their core mission” (131). Meyers gives the example of the nuclear freeze movement that included multiple different groups, and when the movement faded, these groups didn’t just stop supporting their causes, but instead they turned their attention to their narrower focuses that held them together.

And so as I was reading, I was wondering what you guys thought are the “worst” or “best” fates of movements as they fall into the processes of institutionalization. Personally, I don’t necessarily think that it is a bad thing when super large groups demobilize after becoming marginalized because I think that in many scenarios, politics deludes the true intentions of groups and a reorganization of people with the same core mission once in awhile is a good thing.

Furthermore, I think that Meyers brings up an interesting point of how when these three wings develop in a movement and for example, the institutionalized wing looses momentum, the other two wings become less interested to stay strong as well. Do you guys think that factions are the reasons that movements fail? Or do you think that factions are what truly focus a movement? Do you think the factions of the Occupy Wall Street Movement will help or destroy its momentum?

In this chapter, Meyer details the pattern of political institutionalization of social movements that has come to characterize some movements in the United States.  He uses the antinuclear movement of the 1970s, the longer term US populism and agricultural movements, and US labor movements as the exemplars for explaining the patterns and mechanisms of institutionalization.

Meyer provides an operational definition of institutionalization as “…the creation of a stable set of relationships and procedures such that the politics of an issue becomes routine, that is, repeatable for all concerned with minimal uncertainty or risk… The boundaries of possible reforms are reasonably clear to all concerned and are limited” (126).  He then outlines several mechanisms of institutionalization:

1. “…policy makers can incorporate movement concerns by offering consultation, formal or informal, with representatives of a movement” (126)
2. “…elected officials can offer social movement activists a platform or a venue for making their claims” (127)
3. “…government can set up more permanent venues for consultation, formally adopting the concerns, and even sometimes the personnel, of a challenging movement” (127)
4. “government can institute procedures that give an actor or claimant formal inclusion in a deliberative process” (128)
5. “…policy reform can afford activist concerns a place in the process and resources attendant to that place” (128)
6. “institutionalization includes norms and values, not only in government, but also in the broader culture” (128) *noted as critical by the author*

What struck me the most about this chapter was the indirect, implicit discussion of legitimacy.  To me it seems that at the foundation of this process of institutionalization is a search for the right place, a sense of permanence, the right people, and recognition for the need and the possibility for reform.  What the process of institutionalization does for a social movement is accommodating the needs of the cause while providing them with a form of legitimacy.  Following this train of thought, if this particular cause is being welcomed into the political system then it must have a legitimate claim to be taken seriously.  In the title of this blog post, I ask in jest “Social Movements, Too Legit to Quit?”.  But, I think this question has resonance with what Meyer discusses in this chapter because there seems to be a catch-22 with institutionalization.  The process does not just fuel the activistism and/or activist participation.  The social movement becomes institutionalized and gains legitimacy but gaining legitimacy may prompt activists to question what else they can do for their cause.  Can institutionalization make a movement “too legit” and make the activists quit?

After reading this chapter, I’m left considering the following questions which I now pose to you:

• Is the process of institutionalization as described by Meyers just another way of phrasing the process of negotiation? Or is it a grander process of gaining legitimacy? Or is it simply selling out?
• Do you think that institutionalization is necessary or even inevitable?
  Can you imagine OWS engaging in institutionalization? Or would that be completely antithetical to the cause?

Brittany Mangold