Rhode Island v. Innis – FYS 100 – 34: The Rights of the Criminally Accused

In January of 1975 in Rhode Island, a cabdriver was shot in the back of the head and killed. Five days later, another cabdriver was robbed by a man who used the same weapon to kill the first cabdriver. The thief and murderer was identified as Thomas Innis and was arrested by law enforcement officers. Upon his arrest, Innis was read his rights, and he was read his rights twice more by both the sergeant and Captain when they arrived on the scene. After the third time hearing his rights. Innis stated that he would not speak until an attorney was present. After putting Innis into a “caged wagon,” or four-door car with a wired screen, the officers were told by a superior not to speak to or coerce Innis in any way. During the car ride to the police station, two of the three officers in the caged wagon exchanged a few brief comments to each other about how they hoped none of the disabled children who went to school in the area found the gun that Innis hid. Out of concern for the children, Innis told the police officers were he had hidden the gun. At trial, the prosecutor used the gun as evidence against Innis and he appealed saying that the police’s conversation with each other was an indirect form of interrogation that violated Miranda rights. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 1).

The Court voted in a breakdown of 6 to 3 that the officers conversation in the presence of Innis was not an indirect form of interrogation, and therefore did not violate the Miranda rights. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 2). I agree with the majority opinion, written by Justice Stewart which explains that the Innis was not coerced into revealing an important information because the officers never directly threatened Innis, nor did they direct the conversation towards Innis, nor did the law enforcement officers have any intent in coercing Innis. Justice Stewart also explains that Innis had the choice to remain silent, but instead disclosed where he hid the murder weapon. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 2. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argues that because the officers were discussing the safe being of disabled children, it is highly expected for Innis to reach some level of guilt and want to protect the children from the gun he hid. Justice Stevens also writes a dissenting opinion in which he states that interrogation also includes any conversations or words shared in the presence of an arrested citizen that serves the same purpose as any direct interrogation. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 2).

Although the chatter between the two officers was in the presence of Innis, and could have been used as some sort of mind game against him for the purpose of relying important information, Innis had been read his rights, understood them, and could have choose to keep silent. The duty of law enforcement is to keep citizens safe, not to help criminals from saying things that can be used against them in the court of law, that is the job of an attorney. I think that Rhode Island police did not interrogate Innis and therefore did not violate any of his Miranda rights.

Alexandra Serek says:

November 7, 2016 at 3:11 pm

The Rhode Island v. Innis case set a precedent about interrogation. It further detailed a definition that was laid out in the Miranda opinion. Then by those measures, Justice Stewart decided that Innis was not subjected to any form of interrogation. That information was then used to come to the conclusion that Innis was not tricked to show the police where the gun was. I completely agree with Camryn’s opinion that Innis was not coerced into revealing the information. The point brought up that not only was he read his rights once and understood them, he was read them multiple times is very important. This showed he was conscious of all the rights he had and still decided to waive them by sharing the location of the gun

One point that Camryn brought up that really stuck with me was that “the duty of law enforcement is to keep citizens safe, not to help criminals from saying things that can be used against them in the court of law, that is the job of an attorney.” I could not agree more with this statement. The officers had already informed Innis of his Miranda rights on a number of occasions. It is their job to inform the suspects of their rights but not to protect them from saying incriminating statements. Officers cannot and should not be tip toeing around suspects to make sure the suspects do not incriminate themselves. Especially in this case, the conversation between the officers consisted of casual remarks. It did not have a connotation of being planned or a stunt to get Innis to confess. If the Court were to declare this an interrogation, it would be completely stretching a definition. It would really be making officers do this “tip toeing” around suspects.