Hudson v. Michigan (2006) – PLSC 337-01: The American Legal System

In 2006, Michigan police were granted a warrant to search Booker T. Hudson’s home for drugs and firearms. Once they arrived at his residence, the officers knocked and announced their presence, but only waited 3-5 seconds before entering through the front door, which was unlocked. They searched the home, finding cocaine and a loaded gun. Booker T. Hudson was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of drugs and firearms.

Hudson’s attorneys tried to argue that the evidence found in the search should be excused from the trial because the officers did not comply with the “knock-and-announce” rule, which requires law enforcement to wait a reasonable amount of time for the resident to respond before entering a home. The trial court granted the motion to suppress the evidence, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed their decision. After being convicted of drug possession, Hudson appealed on the basis of his previous exclusionary argument. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, and the conviction stood. Hudson then requested U.S. Supreme court review.

Does the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s Unreasonable Search and Seizure Clause apply to the “knock-and-announce” rule?

The Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that evidence does not need to be excluded when the “knock-and-announce” rule is violated by police. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion while Justice Kennedy wrote the concurring opinion and Justice Breyer wrote the dissenting opinion.

The majority held the decision that the exclusionary rule for evidence does not apply when the “knock-and-announce” rule is violated by police because the breach of privacy that was caused by the sudden entry by police was not associated with the seizure of the evidence. Justice Scalia focused on the fact that the “knock-and-announce” rule was intended to prevent violence, property damage, and violations of privacy. This rule does not serve to hinder law enforcement’s ability to conduct a search for which they have been granted a warrant.

I agree with Justice Scalia and the Court’s decision. Since the evidence seized in the search was directly described in the warrant, I believe that the exclusionary rule should not apply, and “knock-and-announce” rule does not serve to prevent law enforcement from executing searches with warrants. However, had there been evidence seized that was not included in the warrant, I would be inclined to view the violation of “knock-and-announce” as a more significant breach of privacy in which Hudson may have had a better fate.

In addition, I find the “reasonable” aspect of “knock-and-announce” very cloudy. In this case, 3-5 seconds was seen as an abrupt entry by police and a violation of this rule. If this is the case, what would be seen as a “reasonable” amount of time to wait? Is five seconds really an unreasonably short amount of time to wait before entering, especially with the possibility of destruction of evidence? With illegal firearms and drugs as the subject of the warrant, I am not convinced that the officers violated “knock-and-announce” in the first place. Had they waited longer, evidence of drugs may have been destroyed, and the safety of the officers could have been compromised, knowing that firearms were inside the house.

Samantha Schwartzkopf says:

March 27, 2017 at 8:37 am

Similarly to Brendan, the first thing I noticed when reading Hudson v. Michigan was the “cloudy” language defining “knock-and-announce.” I find it odd that the Supreme Court felt comfortable ruling on this case, determining whether the exclusionary rule applies to cases in which the police violated knock-and-announce, when there is no legal definition for the regulation itself. They were essentially ruling on a punishment for police officers without fully disclosing the nature of the rule they initially broke. Scalia points this out in his opinion, stating that the amount of time police officers must wait is “necessarily uncertain.” He implies that this amount depends on the situation and is not determinable by the court.

I additionally agree with Brendan’s view on the holding. I overall agree with it. But like Brendan, I had reservations with Scalia’s opinion. Kennedy makes a good point in clarifying that this ruling does not make knock-and-announce any less necessary when it comes to police best-practices. Scalia seems quite certain, and I’m not sure what his basis for this is, that internal punishment is swift and just at police stations. I think recent events have shown that not to be true in some localities, especially racially tense areas. According to Breyer and Ginsburg, this ruling destroys the “largest legal incentive” for police to do their job correctly and not infringe on civil liberties. I do ultimately believe that Scalia and Brendan are right – we need to look at the logistics of such a stringent and high-stakes punishment for knock-and-announce. But Ginsburg and Breyer are right in that the government could be doing more to fulfill on the “promises” of the Constitution. Scalia’s suggestion that those displeased with a violation of knock-and-announce pursue civil suit is wildly privileged and unrealistic. That solution doesn’t speak to the role the dissent argues government should play in police/civilian relations.

Elise Girard says:

March 27, 2017 at 10:17 am

I agree with the majority holding that the “knock and announce” failure in this case does not justify excluding the evidence from the trial. In this situation, the police only waited around 5 seconds before entering. Had the police waited the remaining 25 seconds mandated by the “knock and announce” rule, the evidence found inside of the house would be the exact same. As Brendan notes, the drug and gun evidence found was exactly what was included in the warrant for Hudson’s arrest. Brendan also says that if there was evidence seized that was not on the warrant then the “knock and announce” violation would have been more significant. However, I believe that the invasion of privacy would have been just the same, because the main intention of the “knock and announce” rule is to protect privacy (for the individual to get out of bed, get dressed etc.). The findings from the search are not relevant to whether there was a “knock and announce” violation.

On a separate note, like Brendan, when I read this case I found the current rule mandating that officers wait 25-30 seconds after announcing their presence to enter to be excessive. The majority notes that two of the aims of the rule are to prevent violence and property damage. It seems to me that 30 seconds provides ample time for the suspect to destroy evidence, or locate a weapon. The majority notes that the “amount of time [police] must wait is necessarily uncertain” and I believe that the standard of 25-30 seconds is excessive to guarantee privacy, and puts evidence and officers at risk.