Illinois v. Gates – From Aguilar-Spinelli to Totality-of-the-Circumstances

Illinois v. Gates – Are there consequences of “totality of the circumstances” for criminal defendants?

In May of 1978, a husband and wife pair by the name of Gates came under surveillance of Bloomingdale law enforcement. The department had received an anonymous letter with a number of details concerning the pair’s dealings with illegal drugs. It specifically laid out their plan to exit the state in the following hours and deposit the drugs, which they currently held in their basement, in Florida. The author of the letter was unknown to the police, who did not follow up as to the source of the letter or the basis of the claims.

The Bloomingdale department began to surveil the Gates’. This required that the officer on the case obtain, most notably, the suspects’ address and license plate number. He did so, using the names provided in the anonymous letter. All of the facts of the case lined up with what the letter had predicted: the wife drove down to Florida (in the car the officer had found the license plate of), the husband flew down to Florida after her (accompanied by a Drug Enforcement Administration agent, on instruction of the local police because of the large volume of drugs purported to exist in their basement, according to the letter), and they drove back to their Illinois home (the numerical address of which had been obtained by the officer on the case.)

At this point, the department applied for a warrant after the fact. Because the issuance of a warrant requires probable cause, the department offered the officer’s affidavit and the anonymous informant’s letter to the magistrate. A warrant was issued at the time, at which point the Bloomingdale Police Department searched the Gates’ house and effects, where they found large quantities of illegal substances and contraband.

Illinois v Gates asked the court a number of questions. In fact, the attorneys for the petitioner and respondents argued orally on two separate occasions before the Supreme Court. The primary question was whether probable cause could be established based on an anonymous letter which, as the attorney for the government phrased the question, “corroborated” the ultimate findings of the police. In other words, should the Magistrate have issued the warrant after the fact if the only determinants of probable cause were the officer’s own affidavit and a letter from an unidentified informant who did NOT pass the two-pronged informant test, the Aguilar-Spinelli. The test requires that, in order for the informant’s knowledge to be used to determine probable cause, the court must know the “basis of knowledge” and “reliability” of the informant. Both were absent in the original jurisdiction case. Did the search of the Gates residence and car after obtaining this warrant violate their 4^th Amendment rights to protection against unreasonable search and seizure because the warrant was not issued with legitimate probable cause?

The court found that it did not by a vote of 6-3. In his opinion, Justice Rehnquist affirmed that, yes, the Aguilar-Spinelli standard was not met, as the respondents were contending. However, he ultimately abandoned the standard in its entirety because it did not consider other important factors that could be considered when determining the existence of probable cause. Though in the oral argument Justice Rehnquist was hitting back at attorney for the petitioner Paul Biebel hard on his understanding of the Spinelli case, he ultimately overhauled the application of the Spinelli decision. It did not matter to the court whether the Aguilar-Spinelli test had been met, because the totality of the circumstances was a better measurement for probable cause. Rehnquist states that “the totality of the circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probably cause” than the “specific ‘tests’, which he writes off as superfluous and far too “technical” when dealing with issues of probable cause. Almost comically, he points out that probably cause is, by definition, probable, and cannot be constrained to two prongs of a case-specific test.

Justice White’s concurring opinion notes that he takes issue with the fact that the court did not address another question of the case, that of the application of the exclusionary rule. Other than that, he agrees with the outcome and methods. Justice Powell additionally concurs, expounding on the exclusionary issue by citing U.S. v. Draper, which found that informants were enough to establish probable cause, so the exclusionary rule should not be applied.

In his dissent, Justice Brennan characterizes the court’s decision as “unjustified and ill-advised.” He argues that the decision robs power and neutrality from a magistrate, whose job it is to look at the facts of the case and evidence for probable cause and determine whether to issue a warrant. This abolition of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, he argues, also abolishes the role of the magistrate, as it gives the police more power to determine when there is enough probable cause based on the “totality of the circumstances.”

Justice Rehnquist rebuts this in his opinion, saying that this actually gives the magistrate more power in determining probable cause. Both justices argue that the judicial branch is a necessary middleman between the police and the people when it comes to warrants. My question is, who is right? Does the “totality of the circumstances” rule grant more power to magistrates or inherently muddle the process laid out to protect 4^th Amendment rights?

Draper case: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/358/307/

Spinelli case: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/393/410/

Emily Stubblefield says:

March 14, 2017 at 6:01 pm

I agree with Sam’s conclusion as to what the major legal question in this case is. Although it wasn’t necessarily the legal question that the court set out to answer, the admissibility of the warrant, this case brought up the necessary question of the standards of probable cause. I also agree with the majority opinion written by Judge Rehnquist, and the replacement of the two conditions with the “totality of the circumstances.” There is very rarely, if ever, going to be a legal situation that completely follows and aligns with two categories. To attempt to limit the granting of a warrant to these two categories, or conditions, will result in magistrates being beholden to the law in a way that could be detrimental. As much as we would like to think that the law is simply a clear cut body of regulations, this is not how the US court system has come to function. The court has been granted, or assumed, the power of judicial review, meaning that they have been entrusted with reviewing the laws in place and interpreting them. This demonstrates that if we have placed enough faith in our judicial representatives to interpret/strike down laws, we should certainly trust them to be able to reasonably determine what constitutes probable cause. While the totality of the circumstances argument definitely grants more power to the magistrate, this is not the only area in which they are forced to use their discretion. Additionally, if the police have reached a stage of their investigation where they are asking for a warrant, then they have clearly determined that there is a reason for further investigation; the use of any potential evidence is not arbitrary or random, and most likely will not affect people who have nothing to hide from the government.