{"id":2049,"date":"2024-10-21T10:49:07","date_gmt":"2024-10-21T14:49:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pilr.richmond.edu\/?p=2049"},"modified":"2024-10-21T10:49:46","modified_gmt":"2024-10-21T14:49:46","slug":"an-overview-of-recent-circuit-court-cases-analyzing-bostock-in-the-title-ix-context","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/2024\/10\/21\/an-overview-of-recent-circuit-court-cases-analyzing-bostock-in-the-title-ix-context\/","title":{"rendered":"An Overview of Recent Circuit Court Cases Analyzing Bostock in the Title IX Context"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/p>\n

Written by Sarah Harker, L’26<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Supreme Court broke ground four years ago when Bostock <\/em>fundamentally changed the jurisprudence regarding LGBTQ+ discrimination.[1]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 . Justice Neil Gorsuch\u2019s opinion broke down Title VII\u2019s anti-sex discrimination mandate to its most rudimentary level and concluded that discrimination on the basis of LGBTQ+ status inherently requires an employer to treat that employee differently because of their sex.[2]<\/sup><\/a> The court explained using a hypothetical scenario: suppose an employee brings their wife to the company holiday party.[3]<\/sup><\/a> If the employer would fire a female employee for having a wife, but not a male employee for the same, then that employer by definition is treating these employees differently on the basis of their sex.[4]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The court makes this conclusion sound inevitable; so we ask: how is this vocabulary lesson being applied to LGBTQ+ discrimination in the Title IX context? The wording of Title VII and Title IX are nearly identical.[5]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Additionally, there is established precedent of using the larger body of Title VII opinions to inform Title IX disputes.[6]<\/sup><\/a> Are the Federal Circuits, then, extending Bostock<\/em>\u2019s protections to those seeking protection under Title IX?<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Below is a short summary of Federal Circuit Court cases that have examined the issue of applying Bostock<\/em>\u2019s guidance to LGBTQ+ discrimination claims under Title IX within the last year. The First, Fifth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have had no such cases in that time frame. Given the extreme contradictions between holdings in the various circuits, it is likely that the Supreme Court will eventually have to take up the issue.[7]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Second Circuit: Negative Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Soule v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc.<\/em><\/p>\n

The court sided with a group of cisgender plaintiffs challenging a high school policy that allowed student-athletes to compete on sports teams in accordance with the gender identified on their school registration documents, rather than their biological sex.[8]<\/sup><\/a> The court stated that \u201cBostock<\/em> did not establish that assigning sports teams based on biological sex would constitute discrimination, much less hold that discrimination based on transgender status is generally prohibited under federal law.\u201d[9]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Third Circuit: Negative Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Johnson v. NCAA<\/em><\/p>\n

In a concurrence to a case primarily concerned with the availability of Fair Labor Standards Act claims to NCAA student-athletes, Johnson v. NCAA<\/em>, 108 F.4th 163, 167 (3rd Cir. 2024), Circuit Judge Porter urges caution in extension of employee protections to NCAA student-athletes, implying that separate sports programs for male and female student-athletes represent differential treatment on the basis of sex.[10]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Fourth Circuit: Positive Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Kadel v. Folwell<\/em><\/p>\n

When Affordable Care Act-funded healthcare plans conditioned eligibility for \u201ccertain surgeries on whether those surgeries will better align the patient\u2019s sex assigned at birth with their gender [identity], they discriminate on the basis of sex.\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/a> Under the Affordable Care Act\u2019s anti-discrimination provision, an individual may not be subjected to discrimination on the grounds prohibited by Title IX.[12]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.<\/em><\/p>\n

A West Virginia law\u2019s \u201csole purpose . . . and effect . . . [was] to prevent transgender girls from playing on girls teams.\u201d[13]<\/sup><\/a>The Fourth Circuit cleanly applied Title VII\u2019s Bostock <\/em>reasoning to this Title IX disparate-treatment claim.[14]<\/sup><\/a> In doing so, it concluded that the youth, who was established to be \u201csimilarly situated\u201d to other teenage girls because of hormone therapy that had begun before puberty, B.P.J.<\/em>, 98 F.4th at 541, was harmed \u201con the basis of\u201d her sex by individual application of the law.[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Sixth Circuit: Negative Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Tennessee v. Cardona<\/em><\/p>\n

The court declined to stay a preliminary injunction preventing a rule promulgated by the Department of Education from taking effect.[16]<\/sup><\/a> The rule revised the definition of \u201cdiscrimination on the basis of sex\u201d to include \u201cdiscrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity.”[17]<\/sup><\/a>. By the Sixth Circuit\u2019s reasoning, Title VII\u2019s \u201cbecause of sex\u201d and Title IX\u2019s \u201con the basis of sex\u201d are \u201cmaterially different.\u201d[18]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Seventh Circuit: Positive Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

A.C. v. Metro School District<\/em><\/p>\n

Bostock<\/em>\u2019s reasoning\u00a0 was applied to a Title IX challenge that alleged sex discrimination pursuant to a school bathroom policy forbidding transgender youth from using the bathroom that aligned with their gender identity.[19]<\/sup><\/a> The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court\u2019s choice to refrain from reaching bathroom policies with their Bostock <\/em>holding not as a statement that some \u201cfundamental difference between bathroom policies and employment decisions\u201d should restrict the Bostock<\/em> holding to Title VII issues, but rather that the Supreme Court was merely confining itself to the issue before it, and therefore felt free to \u201c[apply] Bostock<\/em>\u2019s reasoning to Title IX.\u201d[20]<\/sup><\/a> Ultimately, the court found that the transgender students had a likelihood of succeeding on their claim, and upheld the district court\u2019s preliminary injunction allowing them to use their preferred bathroom while the case proceeded.[21]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Ninth Circuit: Positive Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Doe v. Horne<\/em><\/p>\n

In another case challenging a \u201cSave Women\u2019s Sports Act,\u201d this time in Arizona, biologically male students were prohibited from participating in women\u2019s and girls\u2019 sports.[22]<\/sup><\/a> The court applied Bostock<\/em>\u2019s reasoning, and concluded that legislation which limits athletic opportunities only for transgender girls and women \u201cis the essence of discrimination.\u201d[23]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Tenth Circuit: Neutral Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Dimas v. Pecos Independent School District Board of Education<\/em><\/p>\n

The defendant school officials were found to have qualified immunity from the Title IX claims in this case.[24]<\/sup><\/a> In a footnote, however, the court stated that they assumed for purposes of the appeal that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is sex-based discrimination.[25]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

Eleventh Circuit: Negative Treatment<\/strong><\/p>\n

Alabama v. United States Secretary of Education<\/em><\/p>\n

Similarly to Tennessee v. Cardoza<\/em>, supra<\/em>, the Eleventh Circuit found the challenge to a Department of Education rule likely to be successful, and granted an injunction preventing the rule from taking effect.[26]<\/sup><\/a> The rule would have expanded protections \u201con the basis of sex\u201d to include LGBTQ+ people.[27]<\/sup><\/a>. But the court instead decided, \u201cgiven [previous holding] that \u2018sex\u2019 in Title IX \u2018unambiguously\u2019 refers to \u2018biological sex\u2019 and not \u2018gender identity,\u2019 it is certainly highly likely that the Department’s new regulation defining discrimination \u2018on the basis of sex\u2019 to include \u2018gender identity\u2019 is contrary to law and \u2018in excess of statutory . . . authority.\u2019\u201d[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Erin Rooke, Ad Campaign Celebrates Trans Athletes and the Joy of Youth Sports<\/em>, LGBTQ Nation (Mar. 13, 2022) https:\/\/www.lgbtqnation.com\/2022\/03\/ad-campaign-celebrates-trans-athletes-joy-youth-sports\/.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/sup><\/a> Colton Shelly, Bostock and Its Progeny: A Path to Protection for the LGBTQ+<\/em>, 30 Cardozo J. Equal Rts. & Soc. Just. 569, 570 (2024).<\/p>\n

[2]<\/sup><\/a> Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 662 (2020).(\u201cAt bottom, these cases involve no more than the straightforward application of legal terms with plain and settled meanings. For an employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the employer must intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of sex.\u201d).<\/p>\n

[3]<\/sup><\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[4]<\/sup><\/a> Id.<\/em><\/p>\n

[5]<\/sup><\/a> Compare <\/em>20 U.S.C. \u00a7 1681(a) (\u201con the basis of sex\u201d); with<\/em> 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e-2 (\u201cbecause of . . . sex\u201d).<\/p>\n

[6]<\/sup><\/a> Jennings v. Univ. of N.C.<\/em>, 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007); Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd.<\/em>, 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 2020); see also Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ.<\/em>, 526 U.S. 629, 651, (1999).<\/p>\n

[7]<\/sup><\/a> Suzanne Eckes, A Conflict in the Courts: An Update on School Restroom Policies<\/em>, 11 Child & Fam. L. J. 1, 3 (2023).<\/p>\n

[8]<\/sup><\/a> Soule v. Conn. Ass\u2019n of Schs., Inc., 90 F.4th 34, 41 (2nd Cir. 2023).<\/p>\n

[9]<\/sup><\/a> Id.<\/em> at 62 (internal quotation omitted).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[10]<\/sup><\/a> Id. <\/em>at 193 (\u201cThese potentially disruptive collateral effects implicate many other statutory schemes . . . providing another reason to slow down and proceed warily.\u201d)<\/p>\n

[11]<\/sup><\/a> Kadel v. Folwell, 100 F.4th 122, 154 (4th Cir. 2024).<\/p>\n

[12]<\/sup><\/a> Kadel, 100 F.4th<\/em> at 163\u201364; 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 18116(a)).<\/p>\n

[13]<\/sup><\/a> B.P.J. v. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.<\/em>, 98 F.4th 542, 550 (4th Cir. 2024); W. Va. Code \u00a7 18-2-25d(b)(3) & (c)(2).<\/p>\n

[14]<\/sup><\/a> B.P.J.<\/em>, 98 F.4th 564 (\u201cBut legislators’ \u2018expected applications\u2019 of a statute \u2018can never defeat unambiguous statutory text.\u2019\u201d)(quoting Bostock<\/em>, 590 U.S. at 674).<\/p>\n

[15]<\/sup><\/a> Id.<\/em> at 565.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/sup><\/a> Tennessee v. Cardona, No. 24-5588, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17600, at *3 (6th Cir. July 17, 2024).<\/p>\n

[17]<\/sup><\/a> 89 Fed. Reg. 33886<\/p>\n

[18]<\/sup><\/a> Tennessee<\/em>, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17600, at *8.<\/p>\n

[19]<\/sup><\/a> A.C. v. Metro Sch. Dist., 75 F.4th 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2023).<\/p>\n

[20]<\/sup><\/a> Id. <\/em>at 769.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/sup><\/a> Id. <\/em>at 775.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/sup><\/a> Ariz. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 15-120.02 (LexisNexis, current through 56th<\/sup> Leg.\u2019s 2nd Reg. Sess. 2024).<\/p>\n

[23]<\/sup><\/a> Doe v. Horne, 115 F.4th 1083, 1107 (9th Cir. 2024).<\/p>\n

[24]<\/sup><\/a> Dimas v. Pecos Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 23-2064, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10378, at *29 (10th Cir. Apr. 30 2024).<\/p>\n

[25]<\/sup><\/a> Dimas<\/em>, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10378, n.9.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/sup><\/a> Alabama v. U.S. Sec\u2019y of Educ., No. 24-12444, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 21358, at *11, *4.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/sup><\/a> Id.<\/em> at *3.<\/p>\n

[28]<\/sup><\/a> Id.<\/em> at *11.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

What is this citation referring to?<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

There was supposed to be a picture there; I guess it didn’t come through when I copied and pasted from word.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Written by Sarah Harker, L’26 The Supreme Court broke ground four years ago when Bostock fundamentally changed the jurisprudence regarding LGBTQ+ discrimination.[1]\u00a0 . Justice Neil Gorsuch\u2019s opinion broke down Title VII\u2019s anti-sex discrimination mandate to its most rudimentary level and concluded that discrimination on the basis of LGBTQ+ status inherently requires an employer to treat that employee differently because of their sex.[2] The court explained … Continue reading An Overview of Recent Circuit Court Cases Analyzing Bostock in the Title IX Context<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6422,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[51366,67126],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2049","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-blog-post","category-recent-posts"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2049","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6422"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2049"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2049\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2052,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2049\/revisions\/2052"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2049"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2049"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/pilr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2049"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}