{"id":654,"date":"2013-03-07T15:03:14","date_gmt":"2013-03-07T20:03:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/?p=654"},"modified":"2013-03-07T15:03:14","modified_gmt":"2013-03-07T20:03:14","slug":"you-cant-get-from-is-to-ought","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/2013\/03\/07\/you-cant-get-from-is-to-ought\/","title":{"rendered":"You can&#8217;t get from &#8220;is&#8221; to &#8220;ought&#8221;."},"content":{"rendered":"<p>That&#8217;s an old principle, often attributed to David Hume if I&#8217;m not mistaken. It means that there&#8217;s no chain of reasoning that takes you from\u00a0<em>factual<\/em> statements about the way the world is to\u00a0<em>normative<\/em> statements about the way things should be.<\/p>\n<p>That&#8217;s not to say that factual statements are irrelevant to ethical questions, just that when you&#8217;re engaged in ethical reasoning you need some sort of additional inputs.<\/p>\n<p>Religious traditions often give such inputs. For the non-religious, one common point of view is utilitarianism, which is the idea that you ought to do the things that will maximize some sort of total worldwide &#8220;utility&#8221; (or &#8220;happiness&#8221; or &#8220;well-being&#8221; or something like that). The point is that in either case you have to take some sort of normative (&#8220;ought&#8221;) statement as an axiom, which can&#8217;t be derived from observations about the way the world is.<\/p>\n<p>For what it&#8217;s worth, I think that Hume is right about this.<\/p>\n<p>The reason I&#8217;m mentioning all this utterly unoriginal stuff right now is because I want to link to a <a href=\"http:\/\/www.preposterousuniverse.com\/blog\/2013\/03\/07\/science-morality-possible-worlds-scientism-and-ways-of-knowing\/\">piece that Sean Carroll wrote<\/a> on all this. In my opinion, he gets it exactly right.<\/p>\n<p>Sean&#8217;s motivation for writing this is that some people claim from time to time that ethics can be (either now or in the future) reduced to science &#8212; i.e., that we&#8217;ll be able to answer questions about what ought to be done purely by gathering empirical data. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.samharris.org\/the-moral-landscape\">Sam Harris<\/a> is probably the most prominent proponent of this point of view these days. If Hume (and Sean and I) are right, then this can&#8217;t be done without additional assumptions, and we need to think carefully about what those assumptions are and whether they&#8217;re right.<\/p>\n<p>I haven&#8217;t read Harris&#8217;s book, but I&#8217;ve read some shorter pieces he&#8217;s written on the subject. As far as I can tell (and I could be wrong about this), Harris seems to take some sort of utilitarianism for granted &#8212; that is, he takes it as self-evident that <em>(a)<\/em> there is some sort of global utility that (at least in principle) can be measured, and that <em>(b)<\/em> maximizing it is what one ought to do.<\/p>\n<p>Personally, I don&#8217;t think either of those statements is obvious. At the very least, they need to be stated explicitly and supported by some sort of argument.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>That&#8217;s an old principle, often attributed to David Hume if I&#8217;m not mistaken. It means that there&#8217;s no chain of reasoning that takes you from\u00a0factual statements about the way the world is to\u00a0normative statements about the way things should be. That&#8217;s not to say that factual statements are irrelevant to ethical questions, just that when &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/2013\/03\/07\/you-cant-get-from-is-to-ought\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">You can&#8217;t get from &#8220;is&#8221; to &#8220;ought&#8221;.<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-654","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/654","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=654"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/654\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=654"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=654"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/physicsbunn\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=654"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}