Notes:

Buchanan, James M., and Yong J. Yoon. 2006. “All Voting Is Strategic.” Public Choice 129

(1/2): 159–67

I need to read up on the impossibility theorem to fully understand the context of this paper

Two Questions: Q (1) Given knowledge of individual ordinal preferences over "social states," is it possible to construct a "social welfare function," defined over these alternatives that will satisfy plausibly accept able criteria for stability? (2) Given a defined rule of aggregation, how do participants in a collectively organized group make effective "collective choices" among the alternatives confronted? Q

Q: there is no need to refer explicitly to individual choice behavior, as such. An individual in this construction is simply defined as the ordinal preference ordering over properly defined "social states" - an ordering that exists independent of any specific behavior Q

* When addressing first question

For second question, individual choice is very important

Thesis: This paper argues that public choice theorists must reevaluate their examination of individual choice in the voting process. Q The benchmark seemingly offered by the primitive ordinal preferences must be jettisoned in the recognition that all voting is necessarily "strategic" rather than "parametric " as these terms are commonly understood Q

* Shift in perspective will allow an emphasis on Q 1) the relevance of intrapersonal evaluation of utility differences among outcomes and (2) information concerning others' voting behavior Q

In Economic thinking, personal choice on preference ordering happens in a vacuum, without regard to possible “social” results of the decisions made

In Collective action settings, the opposite is true, therefore leading to decision making with strategy

* Q voting, the individual selects among the available strategies and, if rational, will choose that strategy which will maximally further the achievement of the ultimate end-state that stands highest on the primitive preference ordering of all such feasible end-states. Q

Even voting outside of what seems strategic considering end-state preference ordering, which is sometimes called dishonest or insincere, is in fact still strategic

* I’m not sure I understand or agree with this

If we isolate the voter from all other voters and provide them with discrete options, then we can again view their choice as emblematic of their preference ordering, similar to the economic model.

Moving beyond these conditions, the voter’s decision no longer says anything about their preferences

Look up what a majoritarian cycle is

How can voters take other votes into account?

* Should other voters be taken into account when voting? In small scale situations maybe, but in large national elections strategizing against what other voters might do seems impossible

Concept of intrapersonal utility. Important to consider when thinking about voting behavior.

* For my possible thesis: What has higher utility, personal issues or social issues?

Q This conclusion remains relevant even in those large-number circumstances in which the individual voter faces a very small prospect of being able to influence the electoral outcome. In this case, the choice behavior of the single voter is "nonstrategic" in the sense that such behavior does not take place in any expectation of being able to influence the behavior of others. But individual voting choice must be motivated by an expectation that the collective result can be influenced at least probabilistically. Absent this expectation, any motivation for voting at all disappears. Hence, the voting choice remains "strategic" in the sense that the behavior itself depends on the predictions that are made about others' behavior Q

* I need to examine this paragraph more deeply

Voting needs to be analyzed in a game theory framework rather than market choice theory framework. However, game theory generally only is applied to small interactions so far, so further work is needed on game theory that can be applied to any number of participants to fully understand voting behavior.