The Great War: Modernity & Memory

Linguistic Oppression in the German Empire by Ernest Barker further illustrates a vivid picture of the German man’s imposition of his values, his kultur, and his supposedly superior identity onto those he ruled; he does so by using language as a vessel for such assimilation. Barker refers to three specific instances of linguistic assimilation and oppression in the areas ruled by the German Empire: Prussian Poland, Danish Slesvig, and Alsace-Lorraine. (This is not to say that the empire was succesful in all their attempts.) He presents how the German Empire imposed onto these regions the “use of an alien speech–a speech which is the vehicle of a culture that is not their own” (Barker 6); subsequently, the native languages of these regions are oppressed by law, affecting everything from education and religion, to legal matters and home life itself.

As established by the empire’s efforts in Poland, the general model it followed then on is described as follows: The empire mandates the use of the German language, and in some cases German alone, in schools. Furthermore, it adds in that religious instruction should also be taught in German, subtly enforcing anti-Catholic sentiment by forcing children to learn their religion in a language not their own (Barker 14). The oppression eventually bleeds into the household, such as through an 1899 decree in Poland that required families to converse purely in German. Even the young and deaf-mute are required to be taught in German, thus making communication with their loved ones difficult (Barker 14).

Furthermore, enforcing the use of German in local meetings, gatherings. and press/news effectively barred freedom of expression or speech. Thus, German oppression attempted to bring about “intellectual stagnation” (Barker 18) onto those they ruled. (One would assume that German imposition of values they deemed superior would “elevate” the Polish. I believe the stagnation only goes to show how misguided the oppressive efforts were.)

All of it leaves us to wonder why the German Empire would impose such restrictions in the first place. The easy and simple answer would be to say that the Germans were deluded in their radical nationalism. While correct overall, I believe some depth would benefit our understanding of the pre-war German mindset.

According to Barker, the German “folk” felt their culture’s spirit “within” them and sought to show others the majesty of the German collective; “the ‘culture’ of the folk–the nation or people–thus becomes a sacred tradition; and the language in which it is enshrined becomes, as it were, the vehicle which carries the holy ark of the covenant” (Barker 4). (It seems contradictory to me how German radicalism prioritized ‘breaking out’ as the individual, yet the ideology itself created a uniform German collective.)

Barker also explains how, because they kept their language so detached from everyone else’s by refusing to adopt phrases, the German language stood as “self-sufficient” (Barker 5), which I believe may be why while they believed it would stand out, it instead became hard to learn for other learners.

Most importantly however, Barker says that the oppression was enforced because Germans believed that they were doing their regions a favor; they believed that since their language and culture were so universally good, they must be doing good by forcing it on their subjects. After all, “if men are forced to use it, they are after all being “forced to be free” (Barker 8) from the shackles of traditional inferiority.

Admittedly, we are left to trust Barker and his claims, which one should always do with a sizable amount of salt. If true however, the German people, in their own deluded way, believed that they were doing good “sacred” work and bettering those around them. This justification drove them, it drove them to try to oppress and silence everything they couldn’t fluently speak themselves.

“Report of  1917” was the title of  the pamphlet that intrigued me immediately. The pamphlet, a product of the Treasury Department, presents an extensive report in three parts about the efforts of a women exclusive committee to raise Liberty Bonds for the war efforts. Part one gives the structure and leadership of the committee, which were highly organized into localities across the nation. Part two reports on past campaigns and methods, of which I found the most  notable references “Cooperation With Government Departments” and “Special Features”. Part three looks forward to goals, savings and future methods to raise liberty loans. This pamphlet is an example of large scale organization of individuals that were voluntarily serving the federal government’s mobilization effort. An additional historical element of this pamphlet is how it fits into the trend of women’s behavior and efforts during the war.

Women working towards the war effort tended to organize in  private chapters but this effort of liberty bonds was uniquely close to federal government for a women’s organization. Interestingly,  Mrs. McAdoo served as the chairman (rather chairwoman) of the committee whose husband, William McAdoo, was Secretary of the Treasury. This connection poses questions but the pamphlet reveals nothing regarding the implications of nepotism. In the introduction of the pamphlet, the committee thanks the secretary of Treasury for the opportunity stating “first time in history… the United States has appointed a national women’s Committee, giving it the same recognition and privilege as other committees of his department”(6). The government did give these women  a significant job but I would question if they truly received the same “recognition and privilege” as other all male counterparts. Regardless, they conveyed their gratitude to the patriarchal government for the opportunity and proceded to do their duty in traditionally female way.

Large parts of this pamphlet were mostly bureaucratic for the Treasury Department, but the most interesting aspect were the descriptions of the events the women organized. The committees across the country organized events to raise liberty bonds with school children, parades and other lighthearted events, making their activities traditionally maternal and feminine.  One example of this can be seen in a school district in Detroit in which representatives from the National Woman’s Liberty Loan Committee went to English courses and the children devoted their time to liberty loan work, writing speeches and drawing.  The children then gave said speeches to different rooms of adults and raised $1,500,000 (32). Another effort of the committee was in Illinois where the Governor consented to give 3American flags  to the school district with the greatest number of bonds sold. The school districts raised $1,130,350 (32). In addition to these school-centered efforts, the Women’s Committee put on community parades with patriotic flare to raise liberty bonds (33). The work of the National Woman’s Liberty Loan Committee was not limited to these type of projects, but they were a significant aspect of their efforts.  This behavior fits into a national trend in which women worked through the maternal domain, schools and children, to their achieve their goals and the goals of the nation. 

I chose to look at a pamphlet dated October 1918 that was part of the War Information Series of the Committee on Public Information.  The German-Bolshevik conspiracy was a collection of communications between the German Imperial government and the Russian Bolshevik government obtained by Edgar Sisson, the Petrograd representative of the Committee on Public Information, that “show the present head of the Bolshevik Government—Lenin and Trotsky and their associates are German agents” and “that the current Bolshevik Government is not a Russian government at all but a German government acting solely in the interests of Germany and betraying the Russian people” (3).

I was surprised that Creel and the CPI would blame the Russian Revolution on the Germans.  However, the presented relationship between the German Imperial government and the Russian Bolshevik government plays on public sentiment with factual evidence as a means of support. Though Lenin and Trotsky were not German, the CPI presents them as agents of Germany to stir more public sentiment against the Germans. The Germans were to blame for an Allied power withdrawing from the war, not the incompetence of the Czar or long-term peasant poverty and a growing industrial urban workforce that was discontent.

The CPI claims that the peace between Russia and Germany established in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk is “harder upon the Russian people as punishment to the ambition of it tools in seeking to become too powerful, and in hoping…that they [Lenin and Trotsky] could double-cross their masters by turning a simulated German revolution into a real one” (15).  The use of “tools” and “masters” to emphasize the totalitarian nature of the German government and builds on the social perception of the Germans as being powerful.  The Russians almost became too powerful and so were put down by the Germans forcefully.  The Russian people were suffering because of the greed of the Germans that were leading them.  Lenin and Trotsky were enemies not only because they were socialists but because they were German agents.

The Russians are portrayed as having lost to the German government like how the German people. The US was fighting to save the German people from the German government.  The Bolsheviks, however, were fighting with the German government and so must be as evil as the German government, if not more so for betraying the Russian people. The German empire was “the enemy” and so too were the Bolsheviks.  Calling Lenin and Trotsky German agents places blame on the Germans for the October Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 and discredit the revolution.

Though the pamphlet addresses anti-German sentiment of the time, it neatly avoids the subject of socialism in the Russian state and does not mention the ideology of Lenin and Trotsky.  The battle between socialists and the government in the US had in many ways already been won through the sedition act and the imprisonment of Debs.  The CPI was focused on encouraging more anti-German sentiment rather than anti-socialism. Anti-socialist sentiments ran high as socialists opposed entry into WWI and tried to interfere with conscription laws, though many did, in the end, support the war effort.

After having perused through several pamphlets from the Galvin Rare Book Room, I selected one entitled “From French ‘Mascots’ to their American ‘Godfathers'”. Published by the American Red Cross in 1919, this document reveals the translated letters that were exchanged between French children and American soldiers, as part of an initiative to monetarily support struggling French families. These letters are clear evidence of the lasting bond between the American Expeditionary Forces and over three thousand little ones who were impacted by the events of World War I.

The first letter that I encountered was written in 1918 by a small French girl whose father had been missing since the onset of the war. Marie-Louise Patriarche, the first “orphan” to be adopted through the program, expressed her ultimate gratitude in being an American soldier’s “little mascot” (8). Ultimately, this letter represents the encouragement that members of the United State’s Army needed in order to perform their duty. The letter provided support for a soldier to persevere in the dreadful conditions presented by trench warfare, as Marie-Louise “loves [them] with all her heart” (8). Additionally, the letter was tangible evidence that a soldier’s effort was worth the fight. Marie-Louise depended upon her “godfather” to survive through the war. This dependence must have strengthened an American’s will to fight.

Another letter, written by Jeanne Claudel, displayed the impact of the “godfather” upon his “orphan”. As Jeanne listed his academic accomplishments, “1st Prize in French History, 1st Prize in Arithmetic, 2nd Prize in Writing,” it was clear that the French children wanted their “godfathers” to be proud of them (15). Surely an American soldier felt honored to have such an influence over a little one. Moreover, after losing his father, Jeanne considers the American soldier “to [him] somewhat like [his] father” (15). It appears that the “orphan” needed more than money; his relationship with the soldier comforted him. Although this initiative was primarily to raise soldier’s spirit and to support poor French families, the emotional connections that developed between child and soldier were just as important.

The last, and perhaps most touching, letter that I read was written by a boy named Marcel Lefevre. Containing a description of the father’s gruesome death and gratitude towards the “godfather”, the letter highlights the importance of this program: to convince soldiers to fight to protect the innocence of the youth. Not only did the Great War prematurely expose children to death, but it was a time that lacked youthful joy. Marcel’s description of how he “[shudders] at the sound of guns” was heartbreaking (25). It instilled in me a desire to restore his innocence and prevent him from experiencing any more hardship. I presume that soldiers experienced similar emotions.

Overall, the letters from this pamphlet demonstrate the need for emotional connections during times of war. As seen in Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, the war emotionally strained soldiers; therefore, cheerful letters, such as the ones provided in this pamphlet, instilled hope. Letters, regardless of how unimportant they seem, carry a profound influence.

Along with “Rural Education in War” and “Mobilizing the Country Home Garden” as seen below, I chose to study a pamphlet of this same series entitled “Our Headline Policy”. This particular pamphlet was written by Henry Bedinger Mitchell and released in 1917 by the Division of Intelligence and Publicity whose intended goal throughout the entirety of the series was to emphasize “duties of American citizens in meeting the national need in the present war conflict”.

Although at first glance, I believed this pamphlet was going to explain the nation’s primary policy on war and an explanation of why it was happening, I was stunned to find that it details a literal Headline Policy outlining specifics of what rhetoric should and shouldn’t be used when discussing the war in periodicals and other news outlets. The intent of this pamphlet aligns clearly with the initiative spearheaded by men such as George Creel to spread American-centered information to a larger audience in the most effective way possible. It is almost ironic that there was a pamphlet, a common piece of propaganda, the do’s and don’ts of other news outlets spreading their propaganda.

However, before outlining the precise policy, it begins with a page of motivational rhetoric. When explaining the value of a headline’s ability to sway the public to unity, Mitchell uses analogies to classic American pastimes and sport by stating that Americans need to make “Team plays, sacrifice hits, and assists” as if they were attempting to win a baseball game. This device to sports strikes me as odd since it is appealing to an American sense of Individualism and the need to win while also highlighting the collective effort of the entirety of nation’s news writers in constructing unifying headlines.

Surprising the top recommendation for changing headlines is to place a large amount of value on the word “Our”. Instead of writing of “The Allies”, “The French”, “The British”, or “The troops”, the pamphlet pushes for substituting the “The’s to “Our”. Yet when referring to German troops or opposition forces, the pamphlet suggests that only the phrase “the enemy is acceptable”. The intentionality behind the word “Our” is both a method of Social Control and a means for unity and Americanism to spread. The intentionality of the phrase “the enemy” reminds me of the moment in All Quiet on the Western Front when Paul Baumer accidentally stabs a currently faceless soldier. By constructing headlines to strip the enemy of their identity, the rhetoric matches that of desensitization towards the violence when it occurs on behalf of “the other” or Germans.

To me, these shifts in wording matter more than just a method of convention and universal language of the press. A common psychological effect called the primacy effect demonstrates that the first words people see are the ones individuals are most likely to remember. If all headlines or most, are written to the standards of Columbia’s Division of Intelligence, this primacy effect would prove effective in bringing a sense of unity to the people that are part of the “our” and a universal hostility towards “the enemy”.

The pamphlet I chose to explore is titled Mobilize the Country Home-Garden, written by Roscoe C. E. Brown and published in 1917 by the Division of Intelligence and Publicity of Columbia University. Mobilize the Country Home-Garden was published in the Columbia War Papers, a series of pamphlets regarding the duties and problems of American citizens during World War I.

The United States’s agricultural production was an integral factor in an Allied victory and US food production sustained both troops and everyday citizens in Europe. As with other aspects of the Great War, the government and war supporters marketed agricultural production as an individual duty, and it is interesting that facilitators behaved as though each citizen’s responsibility to unquestioningly aid the war effort was a foregone conclusion.

In the pamphlet, Brown stresses the need to increase the food supply for the United States and Allied powers. However, he recognizes the difficulty of increasing and supplying labor for large-scale farming and proposes using available land and workforce through personal gardens in country estates. Previously, individual garden’s “addition to food resources has been incidental to their pleasure-giving power”, and Brown characterizes a prioritization of food production as a patriotic act that renounces selfish decadence, for “if need be, let the flower garden be neglected, as well as the fancy borders” (Brown, 4). This focus on pragmatic frugality is seen in that “a considerable part of the produce of the average family garden goes to waste”; whereas in giving produce to national stock, citizens could use available land and labor to aid their country (4). Brown’s appeal to a sense of guilt regarding luxury is fitting of measures at the time that made decadence unfashionable. It is also characteristic of an approach that stressed marketing, manipulation and voluntarism rather than outright force.

The pamphlet avoids exploring how increased production might affect the market, stating that planting is a pressing concern, and “the product can be handled when it is grown” (5). This urgency regarding food production represents an interesting paradox in US involvement; the United States was insulated from physical involvement in the war and could indulge in ideological debate regarding economic policy and the scope of government, yet demand from the Allies for foodstuff and munitions created a sense of pressure. This approach of stressing production and ignoring inflationary effects was typical for the time and contributed to the Great Depression beginning in 1929.

The pamphlet is targeted towards the average citizen traditionally viewed as unimportant to the war effort. Despite the need for large-scale farming, “the owners of the small gardens should realize that they, too, can be of great service”, and that “many small contributions…will make a vast aggregate” (5). This appeal allows the war effort to feel manageable and reaffirms individuality, a central tenet of American values.

Brown ends the pamphlet recapitulating personal responsibility, stating that “the most inexcusable of Idle Acres is the fertile and tended acre that fails to contribute its share to the nation’s staple food supply at a time of national need” (6). This uncompromising affirmation of citizen duty is characteristic of stigma that came with objection to the War and exemplifies the war’s permeation of the domestic sphere and effect on all United States citizens.

The pamphlet I chose to write this blog post about is called the “Liberty Loans / Guaranty Trust Company of New York” written in 1917 by the Guaranty Trust Company of New York. The bank to display their commitment to the Liberty Loans and to demonstrate their efforts to help the American cause of financially supporting mobilization produced this pamphlet and distributed it to the public.

This pamphlet was produced about the second offering of Liberty Loans by the Treasury Department and displayed the sheer size of the bond offering as well as the Guaranty Trust Company’s involvement. The second Liberty Loan effectively raised $5,000,000,000 in only twenty-three working days, a total feat of the capital markets of the time (1). The Guaranty Trust Company used their capital to purchase bonds and hold on their books and sold them to other investors as well. The bank purchased over $111,000,000 on the second Liberty Loan (2). The bank’s ability to act as bond salesmen as well made the Liberty Loans a huge success. Over 9,400,000 different entities subscribed to the Liberty Loan making this the most widely distributed bond of any nation “not only in this war but for all time” (2).

A large part of why the Liberty Loan was so successful is the rise of vigilantism in American culture where Americans believed if they didn’t take matters into their own hands then the task at hand would not be completed. The name of the bond also lent itself to a “patriotic impulse” and appeal that brought many subscribers to invest in the offering (2). The vigilantism in America had a large effect on the success of the program, even a ““a flying squad of Guaranty employees volunteered their services for a personal canvass of office buildings and factories in Greater New York, soliciting each individual therein” (6). Drawing comparisons to military units as this squad went throughout the city to solicit as many subscribers as possible for the bond offering. The vast success of the bond’s numbers raised “represent[ed] far more than dollars; they register[ed] a patriotism which is doing more to unite the people” (2). While, the bonds themselves were subscribed to with patriotism, the uniting factor of a group coming together also created patriotism and unity among the American people.

The Guaranty Trust Company of New York along with other banks made sure that the Liberty Loans were fully subscribed through different measures. Banks created payment plans as well as created specific loans for investors looking to purchase the bonds. The Guaranty Trust Company “decided to take subscriptions on a weekly payment plan to accommodate small subscribers who were unable to make payment on the government installment plan of 2 per cent” (7). This was one of the methods by which banks attempted to make more money for their bottom line through creating payment plans and making loans for investors to afford the Liberty Loans. The Liberty Loans’ success was of huge importance for the Guaranty Trust Company and “for the actual selling of the bonds, the company lent as many members of its main office staff as were needed” (4). On all fronts the Liberty Loan program was a huge success in shoring up capital needed to supply our soldiers as well as creating a sense of unity and patriotism within America.

The pamphlet I picked to examine is “Rural Education in War,” written by Warren H. Wilson and published in 1917 by the Division of Intelligence and Publicity of Columbia University. This pamphlet was published as part of the Columbia War Papers, a series of similar pamphlets meant to convince Americans to help solve wartime problems and fulfill their national duty.

In this pamphlet, Wilson argues that the United States should immediately begin sending high school boys from the cities to work on farms in order to supplement the existing agricultural labor force. This was meant to help prevent a food shortage occurring in the United States like the food shortages occurring in other countries that were involved in the war. Wilson argues that the need is even more pressing because “we are trying to feed Europe as well without increasing the labor on our farms” (3).  While not yet old enough for conscription, these city boys could fulfil their duty to the nation’s war effort by doing basic agricultural work which would help increase the nation’s food supply. Each high school would send a corps of boys led by a teacher to a farm where they would be trained by a farmer in basic farming skills.

When reading Wilson’s article, it is clearly recognizable as propaganda because of the rose-colored glasses tone it uses to present a positive and seemingly practical view of a radical idea. At first, Wilson’s plan may seem theoretically viable as he places heavy emphasis on duty to country, however his argument glances over important issues with the program.

Wilson hopes that these new farmhands “will be so pleased by their experience that they will return to it during their vacations in later years” (7). Wilson’s idea of vacation seems a little bit too optimistic. It is clear he does not expect these boys to become farmhands for life. Sending ten out of every fifty boys from every high school could also make a long-term impact on these boys’ futures and the future of the society as the gap in their education would certainly be felt down the road. He also assumes that sending the boys off in groups from the same school will assuage any homesickness that may occur. In reality, subjecting teenagers to a monumental lifestyle change is bound to create some feeling of homesickness, no matter who is present. This program had the potential to create a sizable disruption to daily life.

Wilson believes these boys will be drawn to serve out of loyalty to their country. To assist this, it is suggested that the students wear uniforms “as constant reminders that they are at work not for financial gain, but for service to their country” (6). Even as their sons go off to serve, Wilson also expects their parents to contribute to the initial start-up costs of the program out of their own patriotic responsibility. While ideally the new farmhands would eventually be paid a wage, this does not seem guaranteed. Wilson is trusting that the nationalistic tendencies prevalent during wartime will make this program succeed.

To this extent, it is also worth considering how this pamphlet relates to immigration and the influx of unskilled workers into the country prior to and during the war. At the time, many immigrants were entering the country to do unskilled jobs that Americans were not doing.  Taking American boys out of school to do farm work would fill jobs that immigrants traditionally would do, thus possibly discouraging the prosperity of immigrants as their roles are filled by even cheaper labor. Americans were wanted to do American jobs, and they could be drawn to these out of a sense of duty rather than money, thus pricing immigrants out of the market. The anti-immigrant sentiment that was especially prevalent during wartime could have factored into the design of this plan.

While the idea of substituting school with farm service is definitely an interesting twist on the traditional idea of conscription, much like other propaganda, it simplifies an issue in order to gain public support. When closely examined, Wilson’s proposal reads as a short-sighted solution to an extremely complex problem.