Its Putin\u2019s World and the Rest of Us Are Living in It<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Vladimir Putin and his policies are the quintessential embodiment of neorealist foreign policy.<\/p>\n
Beginning this fall, Russia announced its own campaign against ISIS and its support for the<\/p>\n
Assad regime in Syria as the legitimate government.\u00a0 The announcement, although not<\/p>\n
particularly shocking, created waves in Western, specifically US, media since Russia\u2019s policy<\/p>\n
conflicts with US interests. Despite ideological concerns over Russia\u2019s policy, Putin\u2019s measures<\/p>\n
are a clear example of neorealist power politics.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
In an attempt to offset the power of the United States\u2019, Putin focuses energy into maintaining an\u00a0aggressive foreign policy. Using his neorealist approach, Putin intervened in Ukraine and Syria.The neorealism of the Russian intervention of Syria can be characterized by five key factors:power, offensive militarism, security dilemma, balancing power and regime survival.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
For Vladimir Putin, regime survival is the most important aspect of his foreign policy. In<\/p>\n
Ukraine, this is apparent but becomes increasingly blurry in the case of MENA. A key element<\/p>\n
of Russian policy in the region according to Katz is to \u201cprevent the rise of radical Sunni forces<\/p>\n
which Moscow fears will engulf MENA and spread into Russia\u201d. An increase in radical Islam<\/p>\n
within Russia would prove disastrous for Putin\u2019s regime, creating domestic disputes in southern\u00a0Muslim areas of the country. Russia has a vested interest in crushing ISIS to ensure that radical\u00a0Islam does grow within Russia\u2019s own borders. There are also those in Russia who argue that the\u00a0Arab spring, like the \u2018color revolutions\u2019 in Georgia and Ukraine, were an effort to promote the\u00a0outbreak of similar opposition movements in the Muslim regions of Russia, or throughout\u00a0Russia, with the aim of weakening or even toppling Putin. If this is the case, Putin has a vested\u00a0interest in suppressing these uprisings.\u00a0Offensive military behavior for intervention is a cornerstone of neorealism and Russian policy inSyria. Due to an increased threat to Russian domestic peace, Putin aims to fight radical Islam in\u00a0Syria before it reaches Russia. According to Katz in his article, \u201cAssessing Putin\u2019s \u2018Fight them\u00a0there, not here\u2019 Policy\u201d Russia is preemptive in combatting the threat of radical Muslim groupsin order to prevent threats to the stability of its own nation.\u00a0Syria is Russia\u2019s last anti-American ally since the fall of Gadhafi and Saddam Hussein, therefore\u00a0forcing Russia to support its regime. Russia needs Assad\u2019s government to continue to spread\u00a0anti-American sentiments in the region. Putin\u2019s foreign policy focuses on the security of Assad\u2019s\u00a0regime and the state of Syria. Russian policy is not concerned with human rights or humanitarian\u00a0measures but rather maintaining the authoritarian regime, a policy it has continued throughout\u00a0the region. Russia\u2019s policy is dependent on power politics, concerned with enforcing the current\u00a0status of power not judging Assad\u2019s regime on its moral legitimacy.<\/p>\n
According to Max Boot, the key to defeating ISIS is \u201cmore aircraft, military advisors and special<\/p>\n
operations forces\u201d. Russia\u2019s commitment of ground troops will provide substantial aid for Assad<\/p>\n
in order to defeat not only ISIS but also rebel forces. By defeating all the factions opposed to<\/p>\n
Assad, Russia can continue its relations with the friendly regime, while proving its power within<\/p>\n
the region. If successful, Russia can bolster its own image in the Middle East and the supporter<\/p>\n
of current regimes and anti-radical Islam movements. Putin\u2019s increased presence and military<\/p>\n
strength is aimed at opposing the US policy. According to Jeremey Shapiro, Putin hopes to<\/p>\n
embarrass the US and Obama in terms of relative strength.<\/p>\n
According to Fred Lawson, in neorealism \u201cStates take action to block or undercut any change to<\/p>\n
the underlying structure of the international area\u201d. Since the United States aims to overthrow the<\/p>\n
Assad regime with a democratic, pro-American regime, Russia has a vested interest in backing<\/p>\n
Assad to prevent another American ally in the region. Russia needs to maintain its alliances in<\/p>\n
the wake of the Arab Spring which left Putin isolated in the Middle East. By backing Assad,<\/p>\n
Putin will be able to exert more control and influence over Syria and its neighbors.<\/p>\n
The conventional liberal policy of working together through international bodies is of no interest<\/p>\n
to Putin. After the Ukrainian Crisis, Russian foreign policy revolved around distrust for other<\/p>\n
nations, making Putin weary of cooperating on an international level. Erik Voeten claims that for<\/p>\n
Putin \u201cthe U.N. is a venue where states can cooperate against common threats, like terrorism, but<\/p>\n
that\u00a0refrains from intruding in the domestic affairs\u00a0of states\u00a0and that stands aside when states (or<\/p>\n
great powers) can\u2019t agree\u201d. Syria, is the perfect case of great powers in disagreement, therefore<\/p>\n
making the U.N. inadequate to solve the crisis.<\/p>\n
The balance of power in MENA has shifted greatly since the Arab Spring. States that were once<\/p>\n
Russian allies in the region collapsed, leaving Syria as Russia\u2019s last ally. The support of Assad<\/p>\n
comes from a desire to maximize Russia\u2019s own security and interests in the region. Russia<\/p>\n
depends on its alliance with Syria due to the numerous American allies in the region such as<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia and Israel. With little to no allies, Russia lags behind the United States who<\/p>\n
dominates the region with its foreign aid and interventions.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
The largest point of contention in neorealist theory disputes if states are concerned with<\/p>\n
maximizing their overall security, wealth and prestige or instead worry most about their position<\/p>\n
compared to others. The case of Russia proves the complexity of this dispute. In the case of the<\/p>\n
Syrian intervention, it is clear that Russia desires to maximize its security in comparison to<\/p>\n
others rather than overall. First, Putin\u2019s remarks in the UN criticized the policies of the US and<\/p>\n
other western nations. In order for Russia to maximize its security and power, it must stand up to<\/p>\n
the US thus inherently weakening the US on the international stage. Thus Putin completely\u00a0disregards the polices of other nations, choosing to focus on its Russian centered policy, in effect\u00a0looking out for its own interests and its own interests only.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Its Putin\u2019s World and the Rest of Us Are Living in It Vladimir Putin and his policies are the quintessential embodiment of neorealist foreign policy. Beginning this fall, Russia announced its own campaign against ISIS and its support for the Assad regime in Syria as the legitimate government.\u00a0 The …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2666,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-407","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized","column","twocol"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/407","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2666"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=407"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/407\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=407"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=407"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/globalgovernance\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=407"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}