Secretarian Divides

The habit of Western media to refer to conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa as disputes between Sunni and Shia Muslims continues in the case of Syria. Between the nations involved in the Syrian conflict, only one identifies as Shia and three identify as predominantly Sunni. The sectarian divide between Muslims does not explain the interference of Western powers such as France, Russia and the Untied States who do not possess Muslim majorities. Interests in Syria are beyond sectarian divides, which only begin to explain the basis of conflict. Iran and Saudi Arabia are at odds frequently due to ideological differences. Iran wishes to expand its Shia ideology to the Arab world and create states friendly to its regime and religion. In contrast, Saudi Arabia identifies as the protector of Sunni Arabs around the globe. According to Gause, “a sectarian perspective would assume that all Sunnis would flock together… instead alignments are driven by regime compatibility”[i] Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia for religious influence is at the root of aggressive policies against each other but does not explain specific policies in the Syrian Civil War.

An American audience identifies wars, conflicts and invasions on a dichotomy of good versus evil, which infers democratic states against non-democratic states. This analysis for Syria is incorrect. The United States works closely with Saudi Arabia, a non-democratic monarchy, in trade and political negotiations. Haddad writes that Syrian allies, Iran and Russia, “are not pretending to fight for democracy”[ii]. No Syrians wish for the two nations’ involvement due to records of repression and dictatorship. The nations supporting the opposition also continue to mistreat domestic populations with many lacking strong human rights records.

Ideology continues to lack coherence in policies of the Middle East when examining relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia and Iran support Palestinian autonomy. Turkey holds thawed relations with the Israel after a series of attacks in 2010. The relationships do not follow ideological lines on every issue in the region.

[i] Gause,

[ii] Haddad, 5