Its Putin’s World and the Rest of Us Are Living in It

Vladimir Putin and his policies are the quintessential embodiment of neorealist foreign policy.

Beginning this fall, Russia announced its own campaign against ISIS and its support for the

Assad regime in Syria as the legitimate government. The announcement, although not

particularly shocking, created waves in Western, specifically US, media since Russia’s policy

conflicts with US interests. Despite ideological concerns over Russia’s policy, Putin’s measures

are a clear example of neorealist power politics.

In an attempt to offset the power of the United States’, Putin focuses energy into maintaining an aggressive foreign policy. Using his neorealist approach, Putin intervened in Ukraine and Syria.The neorealism of the Russian intervention of Syria can be characterized by five key factors:power, offensive militarism, security dilemma, balancing power and regime survival.

For Vladimir Putin, regime survival is the most important aspect of his foreign policy. In

Ukraine, this is apparent but becomes increasingly blurry in the case of MENA. A key element

of Russian policy in the region according to Katz is to “prevent the rise of radical Sunni forces

which Moscow fears will engulf MENA and spread into Russia”. An increase in radical Islam

within Russia would prove disastrous for Putin’s regime, creating domestic disputes in southern Muslim areas of the country. Russia has a vested interest in crushing ISIS to ensure that radical Islam does grow within Russia’s own borders. There are also those in Russia who argue that the Arab spring, like the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine, were an effort to promote the outbreak of similar opposition movements in the Muslim regions of Russia, or throughout Russia, with the aim of weakening or even toppling Putin. If this is the case, Putin has a vested interest in suppressing these uprisings. Offensive military behavior for intervention is a cornerstone of neorealism and Russian policy inSyria. Due to an increased threat to Russian domestic peace, Putin aims to fight radical Islam in Syria before it reaches Russia. According to Katz in his article, “Assessing Putin’s ‘Fight them there, not here’ Policy” Russia is preemptive in combatting the threat of radical Muslim groupsin order to prevent threats to the stability of its own nation. Syria is Russia’s last anti-American ally since the fall of Gadhafi and Saddam Hussein, therefore forcing Russia to support its regime. Russia needs Assad’s government to continue to spread anti-American sentiments in the region. Putin’s foreign policy focuses on the security of Assad’s regime and the state of Syria. Russian policy is not concerned with human rights or humanitarian measures but rather maintaining the authoritarian regime, a policy it has continued throughout the region. Russia’s policy is dependent on power politics, concerned with enforcing the current status of power not judging Assad’s regime on its moral legitimacy.

According to Max Boot, the key to defeating ISIS is “more aircraft, military advisors and special

operations forces”. Russia’s commitment of ground troops will provide substantial aid for Assad

in order to defeat not only ISIS but also rebel forces. By defeating all the factions opposed to

Assad, Russia can continue its relations with the friendly regime, while proving its power within

the region. If successful, Russia can bolster its own image in the Middle East and the supporter

of current regimes and anti-radical Islam movements. Putin’s increased presence and military

strength is aimed at opposing the US policy. According to Jeremey Shapiro, Putin hopes to

embarrass the US and Obama in terms of relative strength.

According to Fred Lawson, in neorealism “States take action to block or undercut any change to

the underlying structure of the international area”. Since the United States aims to overthrow the

Assad regime with a democratic, pro-American regime, Russia has a vested interest in backing

Assad to prevent another American ally in the region. Russia needs to maintain its alliances in

the wake of the Arab Spring which left Putin isolated in the Middle East. By backing Assad,

Putin will be able to exert more control and influence over Syria and its neighbors.

The conventional liberal policy of working together through international bodies is of no interest

to Putin. After the Ukrainian Crisis, Russian foreign policy revolved around distrust for other

nations, making Putin weary of cooperating on an international level. Erik Voeten claims that for

Putin “the U.N. is a venue where states can cooperate against common threats, like terrorism, but

that refrains from intruding in the domestic affairs of states and that stands aside when states (or

great powers) can’t agree”. Syria, is the perfect case of great powers in disagreement, therefore

making the U.N. inadequate to solve the crisis.

The balance of power in MENA has shifted greatly since the Arab Spring. States that were once

Russian allies in the region collapsed, leaving Syria as Russia’s last ally. The support of Assad

comes from a desire to maximize Russia’s own security and interests in the region. Russia

depends on its alliance with Syria due to the numerous American allies in the region such as

Saudi Arabia and Israel. With little to no allies, Russia lags behind the United States who

dominates the region with its foreign aid and interventions.

The largest point of contention in neorealist theory disputes if states are concerned with

maximizing their overall security, wealth and prestige or instead worry most about their position

compared to others. The case of Russia proves the complexity of this dispute. In the case of the

Syrian intervention, it is clear that Russia desires to maximize its security in comparison to

others rather than overall. First, Putin’s remarks in the UN criticized the policies of the US and

other western nations. In order for Russia to maximize its security and power, it must stand up to

the US thus inherently weakening the US on the international stage. Thus Putin completely disregards the polices of other nations, choosing to focus on its Russian centered policy, in effect looking out for its own interests and its own interests only.