A Third Intifada?

Since October of 2015 over 100 people, both Israeli and Palestinian, have been killed in what some are now calling the start of a third intifada. This recent wave of violence, which is also being called the “knife intifada”, was triggered largely by increasing incursions into Palestinian land by zealous Israeli settlers and by tensions surrounding control/efficacy of the Temple Mount. Given the history of the first two intifadas and the current situation in Israel, it appears likely that a third intifada is a coming reality. That coming reality depends on whether or not Palestinian leadership decides to mobilize and support this recent escalation.

It is important to note that the geneses of the first two intifadas were very similar to the current situation in Israel. The first intifada in 1987 began after a wave of discontent led to massive protests and violence throughout the region. The second intifada in 2000 began after Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount with over 1,000 security personnel in tail, leading to more protests and violence. It is important to note that neither of the first two intifadas began by Palestine as a whole declaring war on Israel, but rather as waves of violence and demonstrations that escalated into greater conflicts. This is why there is debate surrounding whether or not this will become a third intifada – because the situation is fluid and is not a clear-cut war between two states.

One of the arguments against the current conflict turning into a third intifada is the lack of clear support among the Palestinian government for one. This is not a historically valid argument because intifadas, in their very essence, are popular uprisings led by the people and not so much by governing bodies. According to the Middle East Research and Information Project’s Primer on Palestine, the first intifada was not organized or led by the exiled PLO leadership, but “rather, it was a popular mobilization that drew on the organizations and institutions that had developed under occupation.” After the uprisings began the PLO later threw its weight behind the intifada, thereby solidifying and legitimizing the uprising. Hamas and the Palestinian Authority have yet to endorse this recent wave of uprisings, but if the situation continues to deteriorate and animosity among the Palestinians continues to increase, the leadership may end up endorsing an uprising in part to appease the people it governs, much like in the first intifada.

In addition, even though one unified group is not organizing and leading the violence, there appears to be a strategic logic to the attacks that may lead to an intifada. The current spate of stabbings treads the line between all three categories of terrorism as described by Pape. It is demonstrative in that it has attracted the attention of news media around the world and has re-invigorated anger amongst the Palestinian populace, it is destructive in that it has killed civilians and seeks to cause very real harm to Israel as a whole, and it can be classified as a form of suicide terrorism given the nature of attacking Israeli soldiers with only a knife. Pape goes on to say that the reason behind this is to “cause either the government to concede or the population to revolt against the government.” Given the history of Israel, it is not likely that these attacks will cause Israel to succeed, so it appears that the strategic logic in this case is to foment revolt against the government of Israel – By increasing revolt among the Palestinian populace, these attacks are contributing to the escalation of a third intifada and the likelihood that PA and Hamas will support it as a popular uprising among the people whom they govern.

One of the main factors in determining whether or not PA and Hamas will support a third intifada lies in how Israel reacts to this most recent uprising. This security dilemma is a concept that explains how two entities end up escalating conflicts based on the perceived threat by their enemy. The current situation appears to be escalating along these lines. When Israel feels threatened by Palestinian attacks it often responds by escalating the violence even more, this leads to even more escalation on the Palestinian side to counter Israel – it is a vicious spiral that can end in even greater conflict, as evinced by the second intifada where more than 1 million bullets were fired at protesters. This created further escalation, anger, and Palestinian support for the intifada. Furthermore, although the second intifada started with unarmed protesters throwing rocks and chanting, Israeli escalation contributed to an escalation among the Palestinians that included car bombings and much more lethal forms of resistance (Fawcett 262). Benedetta Berti describes Israel as having a “siege mentality”, in that it feels perpetually threatened and often responds with a heavy hand. Given the historical context, it appears likely that Israel will continue to respond to Palestinian violence with more violence and more escalation, thus forcing Palestinian leadership to endorse a popular uprising.

Given the increasing tension and violence in the Levant, it appears likely that a third intifada may be coming. This is dependent on whether or not PA and Hamas endorse and encourage resistance. As of late, there have been no official calls by leadership for an intifada, although PA president Mahmoud Abbas recently declared: “Every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem is pure, every shahid [martyr] will reach paradise, and every injured person will be rewarded by God.” The situation on the ground is clearly escalating and may culminate in an endorsement of another intifada. This endorsement would be fueled largely by public perceptions among the Palestinian people and by how the Israeli government responds to the violence.