{"id":422,"date":"2021-05-02T14:24:44","date_gmt":"2021-05-02T18:24:44","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/?p=422"},"modified":"2021-05-02T14:26:12","modified_gmt":"2021-05-02T18:26:12","slug":"vietnam-1964","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/2021\/05\/02\/vietnam-1964\/","title":{"rendered":"Vietnam, 1964"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Credit: Wikimedia Commons Accessed: https:\/\/www.pri.org\/stories\/2017-09-14\/what-really-happened-gulf-tonkin-1964<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed on August 7, 1964. The resolution was passed after Congress was told that the U.S.S. <\/span>Maddox <\/span><\/i>had been targeted by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on August 2nd, 1964 and again targeted two days later, this time accompanied by the U.S.S. <\/span>Turner Joy<\/span><\/i>. The passage of the resolution gave President Lyndon Johnson far-reaching wartime powers to both repel attacks on U.S. forces and prevent further North Vietnamese aggression.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Despite the resolution being passed in late 1964, talks of the need for a congressional resolution began in December,1963 when President Johnson told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that \u201cIf we stay in South Vietnam much longer or have to take firmer action, we’ve got to go to Congress.\u201d Efforts to support the South Vietnamese government in its fight against the North Vietnamese communist forces were well underway when Johnson took office following the assassination of his predecessor, President Kennedy. Johnson elected to stay in Vietnam following Kennedy\u2019s assassination for two main reasons. First, he did not believe it was politically wise to make sweeping changes to Kennedy\u2019s foreign policy so soon after his death and so close to his own presidential election. Second, Johnson supported\u00a0 Eisenhower\u2019s policy to maintain a non-communist government in South Vietnam. However, Johnson was wary of increasing military presence in the country without the support of Congress as he and his advisers believed that congressional approval would strengthen support for his administration. After months of postponing bringing a resolution to Congress for fear that it would negatively affect both Johnson\u2019s civil rights legislation and his election prospects, the Gulf of Tonkin incident provided the perfect opportunity for Johnson to get Congressional backing\u00a0 with little worry that itwould fail. By framing the passage of the resolution as an urgent, patriotic matter, Johnson and his administration were able to circumvent the long debates and motions for amendments that likely would have ensued had the resolution been brought forward at a different time. The efficient passage of the resolution meant that Johnson could devote more attention to his upcoming November presidential election.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The <\/span>New York Times<\/span><\/i> coverage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was positive but many reporters noted that Congress was not truly unified in its decision to support the resolution. One editorial, stated that \u201cthe resolution is a declaration of national unity and a vote of confidence in the Tonkin Gulf decision\u201d on August 8, 1964, one day after the passage of the resolution. However, it conceded that it was regrettable that amendments were virtually impossible to pass due to the short time frame citing the need for the resolution to include language from Johnson\u2019s message that accompanied it in which he stated that the United States \u201cseeks no wider war.\u201d Likewise, James Reston of the New York Times wrote on August 9th that Congress couldn\u2019t vote against the resolution “without seeming to weaken and repudiate the President in the emergency.\u201d A day prior to Reston\u2019s report, E. W. Kenworthy wrote that \u201cthe near-unanimous vote did not reflect a unanimity of opinion on the necessity or advisability of the resolution.\u201d From the New York Times\u2019 coverage, it is apparent that Johnson\u2019s decision to submit the resolution so soon after the Gulf of Tonkin incident was a politically savvy one. Had he brought forth the resolution at a different time, it would likely have been stuck in congressional debates for an extended period of time, forcing Johnson to divert attention from his election campaign back to Vietnam.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Citations:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Craig, Campbell and Frederick Logevall. <\/span>America\u2019s Cold War: the Politics of Insecurity. <\/span><\/i>Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press. 2009.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Johns, A. \u201cOpening Pandora’s Box: The Genesis and Evolution of the 1964 Congressional Resolution on Vietnam\u201d. <\/span>The Journal of American-East Asian Relations<\/span><\/i> 6, no.2\/3(Summer-Fall 1997): 175-206.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cCongress and Vietnam,\u201d <\/span>The New York Times,<\/span><\/i> August 08, 1964: 18.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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Kenworthy, E., W., \u201cResolution Wins: Senate Vote Is 88 to 2 After House Adopts Measure, 416-0 Congress Gives Overwhelming Backing to President on Southeast Asia ,\u201d <\/span>The New York Times<\/span><\/i>, August 08, 1964. Page 1.<\/span><\/p>\n

Reston, James, \u201cWashington: The Illuminating Flash in Southeast Asia,\u201d <\/span>The New York Times<\/span><\/i>, August 09, 1964<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Credit: Wikimedia Commons Accessed: https:\/\/www.pri.org\/stories\/2017-09-14\/what-really-happened-gulf-tonkin-1964 \u00a0The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was passed on August 7, 1964. The resolution was passed after Congress was told that the U.S.S. Maddox had been targeted by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on August 2nd, 1964<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5084,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[166538],"tags":[],"coauthors":[168960],"class_list":["post-422","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-asia"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/422","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5084"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=422"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/422\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":424,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/422\/revisions\/424"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=422"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=422"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=422"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blog.richmond.edu\/coldwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=422"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}