Immediately following its independence from Portugal in 1974, Angola was thrust into a civil war. After already fighting the Portuguese for 14 years, the outbreak of the Angolan Civil War catalyzed what would be another quarter century of conflict. Though both the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MLPA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were anti-colonial, that was one of the few topics on which they were united. The communist MLPA was initially backed heavily by the Soviet Union  and the weaker UNITA had strong, but more discreet, backing from the United States. These clashing ideologies and foreign pressures led to one of the lesser talked about, yet more deadly proxy wars of the Cold War period.

 

Similar to the actions of the Communist and Nationalist Parties in China to repel the Japanese invasion, Angola’s opposing parties put aside their differences to fight under the common goal of driving out their Portuguese colonizers. After the war concluded, however, the MLPA began to forcefully take charge of the nation. The MLPA took control of 11 of 15 the provinces in Angola in early 1975, proving they were stronger than UNITA, who lost force and unity following the Angolan War of Independence. However, UNITA was aided subsequently by continental neighbors Zaire (now DRC) and South Africa, who both feared the rise of a communist party so close to their nation. After taking back a few provinces, UNITA officially declared war on the MLPA on August 1, 1975, starting a civil war that would persist for over 25 years.

 

Cultural and ethnic divides primarily caused the war, while outside invasions, intervention and aid fueled it for the coming decades. Due to its colonial past, Angola had its borders arbitrarily drawn and thus encapsulated many different ethnic groups. Ethnic Khoisan existed in the southern regions while later migrating Bantu existed in the north. Additionally, there were many native Portuguese who stayed in Angola, resulting in its status as the second largest Lusophone nation in the world (Brazil). Like many other African nations at the time, it was both impossible and unrealistic to unite such a wide range of ethnicities under a common language and culture, causing a fractured society and proving the catalyst for the Angolan Civil War.

 

It was also this time that the United States, under the Ford Administration, continued to reportedly practice Nixon’s policy of Détente, while the Soviet Union took a more outwardly aggressive approach in Angola. Cuba also sent soldiers, hoping to gain a communist ally in sub-Saharan Africa. While the United States and Ford attempted to be more discreet, they did send significant aid to the weaker UNITA party at the outbreak of the Angolan Civil War. When this was discovered, there was frustration among the U.S. public and Congress itself, who proposed cutting off all aid to Angolan groups despite the severity and importance of the budding civil war.

 

New York Times article, written by Graham Hovey on August 24, 1975, exemplifies  America’s bleak outlook on the situation in Angola. The tone of the article is pessimistic and somber, as Hovey states Angola would “need a miracle” three separate times. Hovey  painted MLPA success in the conflict as a  “great victory … for the Soviet Union and its allies.” The article then proceeds to list all of the dangers and threats Angolan civil conflict might have to neighboring states, and concludes by stating “in fact, it will require a miracle to prevent foreign intervention – and possibly great power involvement – in this African tragedy.” In quintessential 1970s United States fashion, the article makes it clear that America is not a perpetrator, but they might have to get involved. By stating the threats the Angolan Civil War posed to neighboring nations, the article was essentially giving the United States the justification it needed, and wanted, to intervene more overtly in the Angolan Civil War.

 

Works Cited:

 

Pearce, Justin, “Control, Politics and Identity in the Angolan Civil War,” African Affairs 111 no. 444 (2012): 442-460.

 

Hovey, Graham, “Angola: Worse Than Congo”, New York Times (1975). 

 

Niemann, Michael, “Review of the Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Conflict”, Africa Today 46, no.3 (1999): 230-232.

Angola – 1975

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