Illinois v. Gates – PLSC 337-02: The American Legal System

The Illinois v. Gates decision in 1983 overturned the Aguilar-Spinelli test in favor of a totality of the circumstances approach for determining whether or not probable cause exists. The Aguilar-Spinelli test was established by Aguilar v. Texas (1964) and Spinelli v. United States (1969) and held that in order for an informant’s tip or letter to be used as probable cause for obtaining a search warrant, two prongs must be met. Primarily, the tip had to “reveal adequately the informant’s basis of knowledge.” In other words, the tip had to identify how the individual came to possess the knowledge. Secondly, the tip had to provide facts that would determine the veracity and the reliability of the informant’s information.

In the Illinois v. Gates case, the police received an anonymous letter on May 3, 1978 that claimed Sue and Lance Gates were transporting drugs from Florida and then selling them in Illinois. Specifically, the tip stated that Sue would drive their car to Florida where she would obtain the drugs, then Lance would fly down to drive the car back. The letter also claimed that the couple was about to embark on another drug trafficking excursion. When police received this information, they verified that Lance Gates had a flight reservation to West Palm Beach and proceeded to survey him in Florida. After discovering that Lance met his wife and immediately drove back with her to Illinois, the police obtained a warrant to search the couples’ car and home. During the search they found evidence of drug trafficking. However, at pretrial, the defense argued that the Aguilar-Spinelli bar had not been met because the tip did not explain how the informant became aware of the information he provided to police and therefore there was not sufficient probable cause. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Once the case made it to the Supreme Court, the legal question was whether or not a partially verified anonymous informant’s tip could establish the probable cause to obtain a warrant pursuant to the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the 4^th Amendment. With a vote of 6 to 3, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Illinois Supreme Court and determined that a partially corroborated tip could be the basis of probable cause.

Overall, I agree with the court’s decision. As Justice Rehnquist articulates in the majority opinion, the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge components of an informant’s tip should not be treated as distinct standards that must be met before probable cause is established. Instead, looking at these three elements concurrently is sufficient for a judge to determine whether or not there are enough facts for a reasonable person to conclude that someone may have committed a crime, thereby establishing probable cause. While Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion is well-taken, I do not believe that revoking the Aguilar-Spinelli test would diminish the intended purpose of probable cause. Justice Brennan contends that without a structure to determine probable cause, there is a risk of judges issuing warrants based on insufficient, unreliable information from dishonest sources, which would therefore be tantamount to police and informants, as opposed to magistrates, determining probable cause. However, simply because an anonymous informant’s tip can be used to establish probable cause does not mean that these tips will provide probable cause in every circumstance. A judge must still make the determination as to whether or not there is probable cause, and therefore, even if this decision makes probable cause from informants easier to be obtained, a judge still acts as a check against unreasonable search and seizures. While it is true that this decision would make it easier for law enforcement to obtain warrants in certain situations, I do not agree with the court’s opinion simply because the Aguilar-Spinelli test had impeded law enforcement before Illinois v. Gates. Instead of focusing on the difficulty for law enforcement to obtain a warrant, I believe the more important question is how to conceptualize probable cause and whether or not that conceptualization will detract from the rights of the criminally accused. In answering the first part of this question, I agree with the majority opinion that probable cause should be considered a fluid concept, in which a judge can weigh the veracity and reliability in relation to the informant’s basis of knowledge. Therefore, in establishing probable cause, I do not believe that it is necessary to determine the source of every underlying fact within the informant’s tip. If a judge believes that a partially verified tip can lead a reasonable person to believe a crime may have been committed, then the bar for probable cause is met. Furthermore, both because the bar for determining probable cause is far lower than the bar needed to prove the burden in a criminal, or even civil, procedure and because a judge and not law enforcement must make the ultimate determination of probable cause, I do not believe that an individual’s rights would be violated by a search in which the warrant used to conduct that search used the totality of the circumstances approach as opposed to the Aguilar-Spinelli standard to establish probable cause.

Kathryn Olon says:

March 15, 2017 at 12:22 am

In the introduction of the case facts of Illinois v. Gates, the Aguilar-Spinelli test is mentioned as having played a role in the arguments presented by the Gates’ attorney initially brought before the judges. Deriving from Aguilar v. Texas (1964) and Spinelli v. United States (1969), the test is two pronged, necessitating knowing first the basis of the knowledge of the informant as well as establishing the reliability of the subsequent information.

However, despite its evident importance in the opinions written by both the majority Justice as well as by those dissenting, the components of the test are not initially explained within the case facts and are not explained until within the majority opinion given by Justice Rehnquist, leaving out a key part of the argument of the Gates’ attorney. Because of this, I think that it was good that Gia initially brought the components of the test as well as the cases from which it derived to the attention of the reader.

I also agree with the analysis of Justice Rehnquist’s opinions through the lens of Justice Brennan’s dissent provided by Gia in this post. I am in agreement with the Court’s decision that the letter alone was not sufficient to provide for probable cause. But I do not agree with the “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach presented. As Justice Rehnquist says himself, “probable cause is a fluid concept.” Because it is such, would it not make sense for determining it to be more concrete?

Rather than being considerations toward probable cause where one component is able to balance less of another, I agree with Justice Brennan’s dissent. Instead of Aguilar-Spinelli impeding law enforcement from using potentially valuable tips, it exists not only to establish standards by which to judge probable cause, but also to ensure that a neutral third party (in this case a judge or a magistrate) serves as the ultimate determination for the necessary probable cause for issuing a warrant. In her post, Gia does a good job defending why both the bar for probable cause is needed and why the judge is needed to serve as a check to ensure that tips that do not adequately meet the standards for probable cause are not sufficient for a warrant simply because they could be of use to the police. For if the police themselves had the ultimate say in what constituted probable cause, it is possible that warrants could be obtained that would not otherwise be.

In addition, it is necessary to establish a standard by which to judge what constitutes probable cause by which these magistrates will be able to determine if issuing a warrant is justified. In my opinion, the two-pronged approach presented by Aguilar-Spinelli sufficiently does so by presenting concrete criterion by which to determine if a tip truly is probable cause enough to justify a search and seizure. And through doing so, the rights of the individual would also be protected by preventing unjustified searches and seizures from occurring.

Sarah Sandlin says:

March 15, 2017 at 4:55 pm

I support Gia’s stance that the “totality-of-the-circumstances “approach is sound. The approach is compatible with the fluidity intrinsic to the law. However, I diverge from Gia in that I am skeptical of the clause’s potential for abuse. (My position is inspired by the dissenting opinion, which I found compelling.) I think that some degree of idealism taints her stance. This was especially evident in the confidence she expresses in judges. In an ideal world, judges would always function as neutralizing forces. However, judges are merely human, they’re subject to corruption. Lax attitudes towards the judiciary are dangerous. By subjecting judges to rules, we compel them to assume the role of referee (as they should!). As sensible as the totality-of-the-circumstances approach is, it seems to make abuses by authorities more likely.

It is important for us to further refine and reevaluate the law. However, as we do so, it is necessary for us to be wary of laws’ potential for abuse. I am content with the ruling because it was supplemented by a dissent that reminded us of the unfavorable consequences of ambiguity. Without this, the majority opinion would feel incomplete.