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Constructing Development Politics in Peru.

Structures are overarching frameworks, they are networks constructed by dots that are all connected and form a specific figure with the connections and relation between them. The timber industry can be considered one of these dots in the overarching strategy of Peru, as can Peru strategy be one the dots in global political economy. My interest was focused not so much on trying to situate the timber industry place in this structure, as well as to determine the relations around it, but rather on identifying how this industry reveals the overarching structure in which it fits. In the same manner, studying Peru's government strategy could be representative of and revealing about the global political economy in which it fits.

Capital accumulation as the basis for existence has been widely criticized and discussed by many authors such as Peet et al, and Baletti (2011) amongst others. These authors consider this need for accumulation, ideologically presented in capitalism and currently by neoliberalism, as contrasting and harming to environmental and social justice goals. The question that this paper tries to answer is simply if and how the timber industry fulfills this "accumulation" goal. In order to do so, this industry has to be placed within Peru's strategy, a strategy that must be defined. Moreover, it is important to ask how these goals and strategies are materially implemented and what concrete forms they take. Simply put, how is Peru's development strategy represented through its national and international (represented through the USA-Peru Free Trade Agreement) laws and agreements? How do politics, laws and agreements interact materially and discursively in the case of Peru? Peru and the United States might be insignificant when compared to the global economy of timber, but it is not pointless to take timber and forestry as representative cases in a wider national strategy, a strategy that probably reveals and certainly composes global political economy.

In dealing with the timber industry and Forestry laws in Peru, it is imperative to deal with the broader structure that surrounds it. Forestry law, is rarely separated from broader national laws and projects; that is from Peru's political goals; furthermore as we will see these politics cannot be separated from the wider global political economy. Every action fits into a framework, in this case the Peruvian framework of action is crucial to understanding the why's and the how's of the specific laws that result from national policies and become policy. I thought it was interesting to analyze the relationship between politics, laws and trade agreements in the case of Peru, since the importance of extraction and trade in the forestry industry is central to environmental issues surrounding the timber industry in the Amazon. I am trying then to see the different layers regarding forestry and understand the framework surrounding the debate. I tried to find as much as I could from national scholars, from which I found a good deal regarding the Free Trade Agreements, and its effects and relation to Peruvian politics. I found historical analysis on the environmental institutional reforms that the country has been through, something I could not find in the most easy and accessible western literature. I also decided to take a look at the last Forestry law made under the Garcia's regime, after reading a very detailed analysis on the newly added section on Forestry laws to the FTA Peru-USA 2008. Broader subjects regarding meaning and discourse around development and nature are also crucial for this paper.

The literature regarding free trade agreements is quite extensive. Neoliberalism, development theories and politics and the developing world are subjects widely studied by all kinds of scholars. Baletti's (2011) "neoextractivism" and its colonial history has been traced by many, even if under different terms. The idea of developing countries in the south depending on the extraction and exportation of primary and natural resources has been the norm, even if today this called mercantilism by many, goes through a process of what Baletti (2011), along with others such as Peet et al (2011), call "green washing" with a touch of social justice. Here lies the importance of the discourse behind every policy and action. A discourse that recently, although not always, has relied on conservation and participation as the base for development, the most recent form of sustainable development in development discourses at the most popular national and global scales. Peruvian and South American scholars go further by directly addressing the FTA Peru-USA in their claim

that the Peruvian state gets delegitimized by legitimizing trade and commerce as the sole road to development. These bilateral agreements, from which the FTA is part of, become the norm and eventually come to replace national laws and even international law (Reinoso, 2005). Moreover, this “corporate right” is said to be accompanied by a strong coercive system to assure their implementation; these measures are directly addresses and “negotiated” between the two parties in the signed agreement and further delegitimize the national state (Reinoso, 2005; Teitlbaum, 2004; Fairlie and Queija, 2007). Nearly all authors read agree on the unequal power relations that are obvious in the agreements, since the United States can more easily find a market like Peru’s than Peru can find the access to such a massive market like the USA. The most comparable market, as well as most recent, as Reinoso highlights, is the importance of China, with whom Peru also has agreements of the same sort. According to these scholars, all actors, although Fairlie and Queija (2007) focus solely on nation states, revolve and act around these laws and policies, that is these agreements are meant to subdue the parties to the laws of commerce and trade. Sears and Pinedo (2011), see more ambiguity to these processes and see the national state as an actor between a wider network, a network that is taken for granted (or perhaps addressed in other studies) by Reinoso, Fairlie and Teitelbaum. Although Fairlie and Queija directly address the evolution in the TLC Peru-USA regarding the environment and what it reveals about Peru-US relations, they don’t address the specific changes that it had on Peru’s most recent Forestry law.

Decentralization of the state is a theme addressed nearly everywhere in Peruvian history, it is seen as a positive thing (Sears and Pinedo, 2011), usually when it comes to achieving successful regulation and control, but it is also seen as an unreal or unproductive goal to achieve in the specific case of Peru. Governance, often associated with decentralization, can be seen as a desired goal to achieve or as an unexpected result necessary for neoextractivism to take place. Peru’s decentralization is viewed by Baletti as a form of governance, which should be viewed as “a particular exercise of power where actors and objects come into new political relations modeled on the principles of a market economy”, this fits with the network of actors described by Sears and Pinedo, although they don’t really go into the role of the market, and with the process of deligitimization of the state. However, these theories fail to see that the state is still central in these processes, maybe not

because they get to decide the terms of policies, but because they are central to its implementation. Under this framework, the state and the actors around a market economy are in constant negotiation, that is laws are not simply imposed by an entity but by an idea, in this case the idea that development is possible through neoliberal policies. Peru is then central from the fact that it decides to enter this development, the most relevant and recent example being former 2006-2011 president Garcia's development plan, a plan that revealed the necessity for further privatization of perceived "unproductive" land, in this case forests, mainly in the Amazon.

The FTAs are probably the main representation of neoliberal politics (which seem to be the means to the desired kind of development), and it is unavoidable to see the connection and parallel that this agreement has with national law's modifications, in which environmental and more specifically forestry laws are not the exception. Vida (2008), for example, traces the historically institutional changes regarding environmental institutions in Peru, changes that lead to further decentralization in the name of the regulation and control demanded by the FTA.

Following Vandergeest and Peluso (2011), the discourse surrounding the privatization, conservation and merely utilization of natural spaces, such as the Amazon, are key to understanding the making of the nation state, if we implement it in the national development goal set by Peruvian politics. For these discussions to take place, whether on this paper, or in the ones analyzed, there needs to be a definition, certain meaning given to forests and natural spaces. Thus, forests become politics. In other words, for the debate to take place, there needs to be a redefinition of nation state as well as national natures, in which natures become national from the fact that they are regarded as a central part in the building of the nation state. Taking the jungle out of the forest means in the sense of rendering unmanageable spaces manageable. This is not a unilateral process in which the state "creates" by himself; rather, to have "counter insurgency", there needs to be an "insurgency" and vice versa, this however, does not eliminate the undermining power struggles.

Peru, as many other developing countries in south america and all over the world has had what can be called politics of liberalization, since the 1970s in a more or less

progressive way. Fujimori is probably the main representative of the push, a strong push, of the country towards liberalism in the name of economic development and competitiveness. Toledo, who came into power in 2001, followed the same politics of economic development but this time, and probably because of the dictatorial history, with a touch of indigenous rights protection. One of its main contributions in this regard was the 2006 Law for the Protection of People in Voluntary Isolation. He also modified La Ley Forestal y de la Fauna, enacted in 1975, by focusing on sustainable forest management, and promoting natural resources extraction, as long as it is done in a sustainable manner.

President Garcia's term, which started in 2006 and which will be the focus of this paper, made its strategy of development increased foreign investment and Peru's further integration in the global market. The Free Trade Agreements are crucial for this strategy, as they were to the previous governments. Garcia's politics are characterized by his condemnation of indigenous population having the "Orchard dog syndrome", which he explained in the local news paper "El Comercio" in 2007, as a "syndrome that means that if I cannot do it do then nobody can". Garcia publicly criticized environmentalists and left opposition, which he regarded as obstacles to development. He clearly addressed the Amazon as a source of development and racialized the debate around it by calling indigenous "lazy and indolent". (Hughes). In few words, when it comes to the Amazon, Garcia's goal was to extend private ownership rights to communal lands in the name of development.

Free Trade Agreements are the main representation of Peru's current politics. By signing them, countries are agreeing that privatization, trade and foreign investment are the road to development. Not only Peru, but many countries signed bilateral agreements starting in the 1990s; they were the norm internationally. Many bilateral agreements are signed by the same country with the hope, or excuse, to guarantee the entrance and assure a specific market. Bilateral Trade agreements are not limited to the United States, China, for example, has become an important partner of Peru increasingly, and the countries have had several agreements between them. The main idea, however, in any trade agreement, is to treat foreign investment as national. Teitelbaum explains, "los tratados bilaterales comprenden tratados de inversiones, de libre comercio, de propiedad intelectual, de cooperacion y de

ciencia y tecnología”; they are also accompanied by a strong coercive system to guarantee their application, such as fines, economic sanctions, economic, military and diplomatic pressures, (Teitelbaum, 2004).

For developing countries; these agreements have among their priority energy, water, and biodiversity resources. For these countries, “siguiendo las recetas institucionales internacionales, el termino inversion extranjera se transformo en sinonimo de crecimiento economico y desarrollo, y para conseguirlo los Estados recurrieron a soluciones unilaterales y bilaterales, ora modificando la legislacion nacional, ora suscribiendo Tratados de Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones Extranjeras” (Fairlie and Queija, 2007). Many South American scholars regard the FTA’s as a tool designed to make liberal structural reforms irreversible (Reinoso, 2005;2011).

Reinoso (2011) explains the need for the FTA to be accompanied by an implementation agenda in order for it to function, which seems only obvious. He explains the need for institutional and normative reform (highlighting that these somehow always need to solely come from Peru), in order to properly reinforce and control the new agreements. Basically, it is about trying to fit a structure around an idea, which implies adapting the parts between them, environmental and forestry laws, as well as FTA’s are only some of these parts in constant negotiation.

The modification of Forestry laws coordinate with the renegotiation of the US-Peru free trade agreements, they show a parallel in the negotiations regarding national laws and Free Trade agreements, the last example being the creation of the Ministerio del Medio Ambiente in 2008. The institutional decentralization that the Forestry laws promote, and which are explicit in the Forestry section in the USA-Peru FTA, allow for environmental issues to be dealt by, not a central authority in the Peruvian state, but by specific cases in institutions that represent and have as members both parties involved, (Fairlie and Queija). To this day, there is no unified government strategy to deal with in depth issues, but rather the government has had a series of strategies of reaction, (Vera, 2010). Moreover, when it comes to institutional and judiciary reforms, the Forestry Law is only one part of the whole: “The drive to convert communally held land into private property has been abetted by a

series of legal and constitutional reforms culminating in the presidential decrees passed in the context of the FTA with the USA” (Hughes, 2010).

Vida (2008) traces Peru's environmental institutionalism to 1991. He considers the creation of the Ley de Marco para el Crecimiento de la Inversion Privada, that states that environmental management depends on the industrial sector in question, as the ground and base for every subsequent environmental law. That is, every industrial sector, every Ministry; has its one “branch” or office of environment; these offices ,merely served as accountants and could not really get in the way of the industry that they were supposed to control (Vidal).

The creation of CONAM, in 1991, meant to coordinate all the offices of environment failed to do so or did not wish to. “Por su lado, el funcionamiento de las comisiones ambientales regionales, creadas en su momento por el CONAM, si bien contribuyen a generar espacios de concertacion, en el que el secretario regional es designado por el gobierno regional, no son un espacio de poder en el ejercicio de funciones ambientales” (Vida). This failure is why decentralization was judged inefficient. The Ley del Marco, privileging production, was stronger and CONAM was unable to coordinate the offices, which continued to do what was in the interest of the development of their specific industry. Parallel to these environmental laws were laws regarding land. For example, in 1995 came the Land Law, designed to promote private development of both the Amazon and the Peruvian highlands.

In 2007, the 2006 Law for the Protection of People in Voluntary Isolation was amended to allow exploitation of land considered by the government of public interest (Hughes).

More specifically regarding the negotiations of the 2008 FTA, “con posterioridad al Acuerdo, bajo presion de la representacion democrata en el Congreso de Estados Unidos de America, en el mes de junio de 2007 se suscribio una adenda que, ademas de precisar determinados articulos del capitulo 18 (Environmental issues), incorporo todo un contenido referido a la materia forestal, con obligaciones solo aplicables al Peru, y cuyo cumplimiento debe materializarse en un plazo de 18 meses; es decir desde el anio 2009”. (Vida)

These precisions consisted on little details that revealed more control and sanction of the parties, like articles passing from “governments will try to do the best that they can”, to

“governments have to”, the major importance was regulation and control to prevent illegal logging.

The agreements state that environmental “inquietudes” by Peru will be taken under consideration but it is not said that Peru will be able to deny foreign inversions that affect the environment. See table by Fairlie and Queija below:

Area	Measures
<p style="text-align: center;">Strengthening the Forestry sector managment</p>	<p>In a maximum period of 18 months, take the following actions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Elevate the number of personal in charge of applying the law in national parks as well as concessions. <input type="checkbox"/> Elaborate and implement an anti-corruption plan for the functionaries in charge of managing and controlling forestry resources. <input type="checkbox"/> Provide sufficient disuasion levels of civic and penal responsibility for every measure that obstructs the sustainable management of forestry resources. <input type="checkbox"/> Impose civil and penal sanctions to desensitivate the violation of laws regarding the extraction and comerce of wood products (amplify the 310 article of the Penal Code). The right to export the product that violates these laws is suspended. <input type="checkbox"/> Adopt and implement policies to monitor the tree species enumerated by the CITES. <input type="checkbox"/> Conclude and adopt a strategic action plan to implement more species. <input type="checkbox"/> Establish an annual quota for the export of caoba. <input type="checkbox"/> Improve forest concession management and administration. <input type="checkbox"/> Create tools that strengthen normative control and verification mecanisms of the extraction and comerce of wood products. <input type="checkbox"/> Elevate indigenous communities capabilities to manage their lands for production of wood for commercial ends, including authorization from government.

<p>Strengthen capacity to promote the sustainable management of the industry.</p>	<p>Strengthen judicial, normative and institutional frames of Forest property and commerce.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Strengthen institutional capacity for the application of forestry law and international commerce. <input type="checkbox"/> Improve the forest concession system performance. <input type="checkbox"/> Increase public participation and improve transparency in decision making regarding planning and management of forestry resources.
<p>Subcomité de Manejo del Sector Forestal</p>	<p>Con el propósito de facilitar la cooperación, se establece un Subcomité de Manejo del Sector Forestal, supeditado tanto al Comité de Comercio de Mercancías como al Consejo de Asuntos Ambientales.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Se realizarán consultas periódicamente por medio del Subcomité, e intercambiarán información pertinente y no confidencial sobre el comercio bilateral de productos madereros en la medida en que sea compatible con sus leyes. <input type="checkbox"/> Si lo consideran conveniente, las partes pondrán a disposición del público toda información que intercambien, sujeto a las condiciones que el Subcomité establezca. <p>Comentarios del público</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Cada Parte establecerá un procedimiento para que el público presente comentarios sobre cualquier asunto. Se tomará en cuenta esos comentarios. <p>Examen</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Las Partes examinarán la aplicación de este Anexo en el plazo de los tres años siguientes a la fecha de entrada en vigor del presente Acuerdo.
<p>Verificación y medidas de observancia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Auditorías de productores y exportadores</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> El Perú realizará auditorías por lo menos cada 5 años de los productores y exportadores de productos madereros a EEUU, verificando que estas exportaciones se ciñan a las leyes. <input type="checkbox"/> A solicitud de EEUU, el Perú realizará la auditoría de un productor o exportador, con el objetivo de evaluar el cumplimiento de las leyes. <p><u>Verificaciones</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> A solicitud de EEUU, el Perú verificará, si el exportador o productor de esos productos madereros a cumplido con las leyes de embarque. <input type="checkbox"/> Si EEUU tiene interés en que en la visita participen sus funcionarios, sus autoridades competentes se lo solicitarán al Perú. Si Perú no accede, EEUU podrá negar la entrada del embarque que sea objeto de la verificación. <p><u>Medidas de observancia</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Las medidas podrán ser: denegar la entrada del

	<p>embarque que haya sido objeto de verificación; y si una empresa ha proporcionado información falsa, denegar la entrada de los productos de dicha empresa.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> EEUU cesará toda medida cuando concluya el período especificado en su notificación escrita; o 15 días después de que Perú haga una auditoría donde se concluya que la empresa cumple con todas las leyes.</p> <p><u>Compromisos asumidos en el marco de la CITES</u></p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Las Partes cooperarán y tomarán acciones de conformidad con el presente Anexo de forma compatible con las obligaciones asumidas en virtud de la CITES, teniendo en cuenta las decisiones.</p>
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The goal is to control and regulate, to strengthen the normative, judicial and institutional framework of forest property and commerce. The agreements ask for more personal policing, controlling and penalizing illegal logging if Peru does not want to lose access to market.

This also resulted in Congress granting Garcia the power to pass several decrees in 2008, “according to Garcia, decree power was necessary to repeal or modify national laws that were inconsistent with the provisions of the FTA” (Hughes p86). One of these decrees was to weaken indigenous rights on land and promote privatization of land.

When it comes to the new Forestry Law 2009, the first sentences reveal the coordination between laws: “La implementación de la presente ley, su reglamento, y cualquier otra medida relacionada, cumplen con las obligaciones estipuladas en los tratados internacionales de los que el país es parte y están en vigor” (Ley Forestal y de la Fauna).

The law shows the creation and presentation of a series of institutions to control and regulate as well as to open forestry resources to the market. Amongst these regulatory entities is Serfor, which proposes to Ministerio de Ambiente a certain zoning, to determine number of concessions to be publicly auctioned. In the law it says that one of the functions of this entity is to promote the access of forest products to financial services, and

international and national markets (Ley Forestal y del la Fauna). Another important one, which is directly addressed on the FTA, is CITES, in charge of approving and supervising management plans. CITES will coordinate and cooperate with TLC amendment on Forestry (Fairlie p.10). Other regulatory agencies are the Catastro Forestal, which is supposed to do the mapping and inventory; the UG,FFS which is the regional “police”; Osinfor and Conafor which are coordinated by Serfor, are in charge of supervision and fiscalization of permits. The Ministerio de Ambiente’s main duty is to determine the number of concessions to be made (Ley Forestal y de la Fauna).

Both the treaties and laws address control over resources rather than protection. A project will rarely be stopped over environmental issues. As stated in the FTA, in case of environmental confrontation, projects will be considered only if they don't represent an obstacle for commerce. If not, monetary compensation: national states can impose environmental, administrative, and sanitary measures only if these restrictions are not imposed without justification or arbitrarily, or if they don't constitute “una restriccion encubierta el comercio o inversion extranjera” (Fairlie).

The national laws and amendments parallel to this agreement seem to be there to ensure that there is no national illegal logging, since the international one, is determined by the Agreements signed. The agreements then serve as some sort of what Teitelbaum calls ““tribunales arbitrales” al margen del sistema judicial de derecho public estatal e internacional”. Obviously he does not see these tribunals as beneficial to Peru.

Its important to note that there have been national laws and amendments that are meant to deligitimize previous laws, such as the Native Communities Act that promotes and respects land ownership by indigenous groups and was set in 1975, and the 2006 Law for the Protection of People in Voluntary Isolation. There is definitely a process of negotiating and certain balancing that is not really highlighted by many of the authors, this comes from the dynamics that can be seen behind laws and politics in a material manner, as will be seen in the reactions and resistance that has existed in Peru.

There is institutional decentralization in theory, but the different judiciary layers leave room for walking in between local and national levels depending on situation. “Imprecisiones entre la función transferida frente a la que, en muchos casos, sigue ejerciendo el nivel central (such as FTA agreements), lo que lleva a una indefinición de límites entre la competencia de cada uno de estos niveles. A su vez no está resultando la manera como operan las relaciones entre los órganos descentralizados y las funciones que ejercen, que siguen siendo, en rigor, desconcertados” (Vera). In the same manner, but more precisely, Sears and Pinedo call this a “network of actors” that allow and compose the timber system, for them, the important thing is their financial, social, and political relation to each other. For Baletti, this governance is clearly what allows neoextractivism, in this case however, it would be a controlled and regulated neoextractivism. Control coming from the desire to eliminate any sort of illegal extraction by the means of privatization of land.

Hughes and Vera see something else as parallel to these agreements and laws: national and international movements. Most importantly is the current realization of the exhaustive extraction and depletion of natural resources that goes on by the civic society, a trend in Latin America for the past years, according to Vera. These national movements reach out for global movements, often from the US and Europe, to be stronger and gain spaces of representation that were previously denied, such as the media.

The most common form of resistance when there are no institutional means to process community’s demands are protests. The Bagua massacre, in 2009, to resist García’s decrees over loss of indigenous land rights, was the most significant in the case of Peru. Although the government denied the killing of civilians by the police force, one of the most significant decrees regarding land was not passed. This example is not to say that privatization of land did not find other means to happen in the Amazon but to show that, even if at the highest cost, amendments can be stopped.

Hughes mentions the AIDSESEP as another counter force in government policies. The AIDSESEP was founded in the 1980 and is a Peruvian organization of indigenous communities. The organization has won several battles by appealing to former laws that respect indigenous rights and labor rights.

These counter forces serve to balance in a way, and to some little degree to control the government and legislation. The bottom line there is still that room to walk in between as long as there are people and movement that question and demand, and above all are aware of these legislative processes.

Legislative processes are in constant negotiation and it is important to keep in mind the frameworks that shape those negotiations. Central to this idea is the mere definition of what we consider to be a forest or nature as resource, as well as state formation. Vandergeest and Peluso touch upon all of these issues by tracing state formation and the politics that have existed behind forests. In few words, the connotations behind words such as jungles and forests are crucial for justifying, in this case the need for civilization, development and control. The dialectics behind the debate, of insurgency and counter insurgency that the authors argue made forests political, can be paralleled in the timber case with illegal and legal logging. Making a forest out of a jungle, implies that illegal logging happens in the jungle, a disarranged and savage space, and that legal logging happens in the forest, a managed and regulated space.

State, in its sovereign and authority form, responds to jungle-based insurgencies with massive spatial reorganizations of populations through displacement, settlement, racialization, and the territorial re-zoning of property rights (Vandergeest and Peluso). These, discursively called nation-building processes, as Garcia states in his politics, are increasingly controlled by new technologies. Again, this is not a one way process; these technologies were incorporated and even invented by conservation initiatives in some cases. The process for forests as political spaces took three main forms, all which can be seen in Peru: the criminalization of activities that are made outside of their respective delimited zones, relocalization of people into areas based on a racialized understanding or relations to the nation-state “goal”, and the militarization and surveillance of the forest, not only by police but by forest management agencies and timber companies. This process needs a discursive (orchard dog syndrome and development discourse by Garcia) as well as material strategies (FTAs, laws).

We can then understand Fairlie’s point: Only once illegal logging is subdued, will its commercial value for exchange value, for the nation, take off.

The discourse of frontiers is easily seen in Garcia's discourse, that's is that the "jungle" is the frontier to be broken by the order and productivity of the nation state. Jungle has the connotation of unproductive in this case. Development needs to reach the jungle. But this debate feeds from both ways, it not only provides basis for state control and civilization but it allows and even calls for violent extraction, that is illegal logging. "Jungles" as theaters of insurgency were tamed through massive rearrangements of property rights, land use zones, vegetative cover, and human settlements. The political violence provided a justification as well as a mechanism – military deployment and tactics – for intensive and extensive national state intervention in landscapes over which it had had only weak hegemonic power. Political violence preceded both forest enclosures and state territorializations » (Vandergeest and Peluso). State building in this case consists on "desnacionalizacion" by a process of privatization of the Amazon. It is no wonder that the Amazon and land has been specialized to such high degree. A proof of this is the many available (to some, often the few with the means to), ways to get access to timber.

Laws should be regarded as dynamic processes that are not stagnant. The flexibility and change, whether by amending a law, or by creating an entirely new one, can work both in a negative or a positive way when it comes to protecting rights, regulating extraction, and protecting the environment. The national politics and ideologies are crucial to understanding the why's of these laws, and to provide the ground for their contestation. Reaction against both these politics and laws have been common in Peru but have only been significant when pushed to the extreme such as with the Bagua massacre, when they are widely mediatized.

If indeed the rules of the market are the base for extraction and legislation, as states neoextractivism, another thing would be to focus in legislation that controls demand and pricing. Illegal logging is done because of the profitability in the industry, this illegal logging has huge implications for the environment since as more land is privatize, the more this sector goes into the "jungle".

Hopefully, the next negotiations and legislation will further and clearly define the power and jurisdiction of regional government, which for the moment are only meant to serve as police of broader and more international than national actors in the global economy.

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