

USAID and Forest Policy in Peru:
Applying Global Standards to Complex Amazonian Reality

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I. Introduction

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is a governmental agency motivated to ‘develop’ countries around the world based on economic standards of functionality and foreign policy relationships. As a publically funded agency, USAID has a responsibility to report and assess the use of its budget to Congress and the American public (USAID 2010a). Thus, public norms influence strategic standards of the organization. An American determination to protect the world’s jungles while continuing to accumulate capital helped shape USAID’s global environmental agenda (Chapin 2004, Peet 2010). ‘Green’ discourse may have encouraged USAID to re-imagine tropical forests as distinct from, and more valuable than, tropical forest communities in Section 118 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (Chapin 2004, Peet 2010). In Peru, Amazonians enact FAA guidelines regarding development of tropical forests, sometimes causing USAID’s agenda to shift (Management 2010: 66). Today, USAID’s agenda in the Amazon has evolved, but the institution must constantly maintain a delicate balance between global, national, and local spheres.

In the Amazon, USAID’s tropical forest agenda met local actors with different land management processes (Southgate 1995: 6). USAID now uses its extensive field network to understand local processes. Recent program reports indicate the institution’s rhetoric has evolved: USAID now articulates Amazonian human communities as valuable and important aspects of the Amazonian ecosystem (Portilla *et al.* 2011: 17). The organization applies this knowledge to policy recommendations for the Peruvian Government (Management 2010: 12). In order to make recommendations applicable to both the U.S. government and Amazonian communities, USAID must constantly translate complex social reality to quantified analysis (Girard 2011). As an institution aware of both local processes and global development standards, USAID provides key mediation allowing the Peruvian government to form timber policy informed by the voices of the Amazonian people.

This paper will explore how USAID informs timber policy in the Peruvian Amazon. Rather than addressing how to transform embedded systems of development, I hope to articulate the recent history and evolution of USAID’s agenda regarding tropical forests. Important Amazonian perspective is lacking, but delving deeply into program reports and websites provides important insight into the institution’s worldview. An overview of development

literature will be followed by an examination of USAID's presence in the Amazon over the last twenty years.

II. Literature Review

The literature review seeks to place USAID's Peruvian timber agenda in the context of development theory. I will discuss discourse and agency, and their conflicting implications for development outcomes. These two frameworks will be carried from broad development theory to specific USAID case studies in Latin America and Peru. USAID's action in the Amazon shows important correlation to broader institutional discourse surrounding global development of the environment. Broad development discourse does not neatly articulate local processes in the Peruvian Amazon. Prevalent practices of illegal logging in Peru carry implications for local land use, local economy, and local civil society (Salisbury 2007). As the Peruvian government seeks to restrain the logging system and empower its actors, it must walk a fine line between empowerment and imposition.

International development institutions involved in conservation have been criticized for using power discourses to repress communities in the developing world (Peet 2010, Chapin 2004). Culturally specific 'environmental' fixations blind development institutions to the social implications of conservation action (Chapin 2004). By embracing powerful discourses surrounding 'the global, 'environment,' and 'conservation,' institutions dissociate nature from its human communities and associate nature and economy (Peet 2010). Discursive power leaves Amazonians at the mercy of a repressive development model (Foucault 1975). Amazonians' environments have been assigned a value in a powerful capitalist system. Logging companies and development institutions alike associated economic growth and improved livelihoods, redirecting Amazonian communities' relationship with their own environment (Medina *et al.* 2009: 745). To critics, discourse legitimizes timber logging in Amazonia, and as it is legitimized individuals become blind to its restrictive nature (Medina *et al.* 2009: 748, Essex 2008: 232). Development institutions must revalue Amazonian social processes, rather than imposing processes, to truly complete the empowerment they profess.

Perhaps it is ethnocentric to believe USAID's policy is powerful enough to restrain Amazonian communities (Mosse 2004: 644). Freire (1970) whose book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* articulates a plan to liberate the poor, believes discursive 'cultural invasion' leads to the 'invaded' valuing the same standards and goals as the 'invaders.' Importantly, Freire sees a

way for the individual to free herself from the system. Pedagogical dialogue between an educator and a student will dissociate dependency and oppression (Freire 1970: 90, 103). To Storey, development schemes provide individual agency, not repression; powerful discourse inherently incorporates multiple actors, and attempts at domination will be articulated, and devalued (Storey 2000). Communication is inherent to social processes involved in development. USAID would not like to hear “self-sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue” (Freire 1970: 70). USAID is motivated by self-interest (Essex 2008: 229). As a governmental agency of the United States, its international development projects must be legitimized by national foreign policy and economic policy (usaid.gov).

Proponents of agency believe development projects are a constant process of translation between many actors, and no agenda is imposed without being altered by the social situation where it is implemented (Melkote *et al.* 2004, Mosse 2004, Storey 2000). If development fosters open minded communication, the oppressed will become active agents in shaping their world (Melkote *et al.* 2004), but this can only happen if a variety of worldviews, beyond a capitalistic one, are legitimate. Perhaps Foucault and Peet should instead look at development as a set of tools that allow for freedom (Sen 1999). Amartya Sen’s book, *Development As Freedom*, views international aid as key to improving livelihoods for the world’s poor-- they are social actors that deserve an equal chance at participation in the global economy (Sen 1999). To proponents of agency, USAID seeks to incorporate poor communities in developing countries into a powerful system, rather than denying them access to the system (Storey 2000).

Literature analyzing USAID generally concludes individual agency is not a result of USAID development programs. Corson (2010) and Essex (2008) criticize the institution for the negative impact of development schemes on local communities. Corson (2010) asserts USAID pervades a neoliberal agenda by attempting to solve an economic problem (deforestation) with economically motivated solutions (ecotourism, National Reserves). The United States can support an environmentally sustainable agenda in Peru, without admitting the consumption habits and economy of neoliberal capitalism are to blame for Amazonian deforestation and illegal logging (Corson 2010). Storey (2000:131) makes a counter argument based on case studies of USAID programs around the world. “While USAID...is undeniably an institutional arm of U.S. foreign and economic policy, it is at the same time an extremely diverse social system composed of individuals with all imaginable political orientations, serving both the

apparatus of the state and the expressed needs of people around the world.” Storey is confident USAID’s agenda is appropriately translated to different global situations. Essex agrees with Corson that USAID is hiding an ethnocentric economic agenda with the mask of development discourse. By assuming “underdevelopment is the source of state weakness” (Essex 2008: 229), USAID limits the incorporation of local process into development schemes.

Medina, *et al.* (2009) finds development institutions in South America are transforming and repressing Amazonian communities just like logging companies. Their ethnography follows several timber management programs in countries around South America, where NGO’s use local populations as tools to achieve their goals: timber companies are doing the same (Medina *et al.* 2009). Though conceptually the timber industry and development agencies are counter to one another, neither desire to engage South Americans in the policy making process. To development agents, success is marked by progress, progress requires change, and change requires training individuals. Medina *et al.*’s 2009 fieldwork supports Corson and Essex’s arguments highlighting USAID’s use of a development agenda toward an economic end.

III. Methods

Data analysis and literature review for this project is ethnographically inspired. Rather than marking programs as successes or failures, of USAID, I hope to articulate *how* they work, and *why* they work the way they do (Mosse 2002: 641). I analyzed USAID reports as reflective of USAID’s worldview and rhetoric; I gained insight into processes USAID uses to achieve its goals. I also received first hand qualitative data from USAID staff by conducting a phone interview with a USAID staff member based in Lima, Peru. My narrative of USAID will be deconstructed and complimented using a wide scope of development theory.

Other work provided insight into this USAID project. Previously, I completed a month-long ethnographic project in Tamale, Ghana, where structured interviews with development agents in the field shaped my conceptions of aid. I never interacted directly with USAID, but I heard from staff of grassroots organizations that received funding for projects from USAID, and learned how USAID’s goals were folded into the goals of the local organizations. I became interested in the larger structure of USAID after this local level experience. Though this paper focuses on environmental policy, social issues are implicit in any development aid. The same forces driving USAID education grants in Ghana are evident in USAID land management

programs in Peru. This comparative context allows me to articulate USAID's motives in a more complete way.

IV. Analysis

USAID is spatially organized through six regional offices that span the globe and topically organized into democracy, environment, education, economic growth, and health. The agency was originally developed under the Foreign Assistance Act passed by President Kennedy in 1961 (usaid.gov). President Kennedy passed the act at a time when development agendas were shifting from short term economic schemes to long term and holistic relationships toward economic development. USAID, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were established in the same era; all three institutions aimed to stabilize and expand Europe's economy post World War II (usaid.gov). Once this goal was achieved, USAID needed a global development niche, and by today it works to "extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms" (usaid.gov). While the term 'extend assistance' dangerously implies dependency, Girard (2011) finds the institution avoids this categorization by associating itself as a 'provider' and 'overseer,' rather than an implementer, of development.

USAID articulates the importance of preserving tree cover, and USAID's role in the effort, in Part I, section 118 of the FAA, added in 1986 (USAID 2004:35). This section outlines fifteen actions that the agency will take on behalf of the president to preserve land and promote effective land management in developing countries (See Appendix A). The FAA requires USAID to collaborate with unilateral and multilateral institutions, and NGO's, on land conservation projects (USAID 2004: 35). The amendment supports training individuals, academic research, reforestation, and progressive farming techniques (USAID 2004: 35-36). The act does not allow for assistance with projects that will lead to deforestation, including dam and road construction, and purchasing logging equipment, *unless* these projects will improve the livelihoods of poor residents (USAID 2004: 36 emphasis added).

Section 118 places USAID in the social fabric of tropical communities. NGOs, governments, and other development actors will work towards the ultimate goal of land conservation (USAID 2004: 35). A close reading of section 118 follows Chapin's (2004) assertion: development institutions impose land conservation agendas on local communities. The

section prioritizes saving trees over saving Amazonian cultures. The social communities that reside in valuable ecosystems are articulated in quantitative economic terms: they are valued in action, but not in existence (Chapin 2004). The “poor” should be “improved” while the forest should be “conserved” and “rehabilitated” (USAID 2004: 35). Conserving land is the motivation behind timber reform. USAID seems to indicate the preserved environment, rather than socially sound industry, measures policy success. Importantly, USAID’s rhetoric has evolved over time.

USAID’s collaborative process, though imperfect, has informed their rhetoric since 1987. Dynamic social processes are inherent to community land management programs in the Amazon. USAID’s field presence will give a more informed policy perspective than a think tank without ‘boots on the ground.’ USAID positions itself to translate and unify varying social agendas. Rather than facilitating dialogue, several field projects conclude USAID programs impose agendas in conflict with local norms (Southgate 1995, Salisbury 2007, Corson 2010). Broadly established guidelines for conserving tropical forests around the globe inspire USAID’s programs and policies regarding local Amazonian populations. A 2011 USAID report on Peru’s progress regarding FAA Section 118 resituates the relationship between the forest and its social aspects: “the authors of this document see the incorporation of indigenous people and their traditional knowledge into policies and management strategies as an opportunity that has been currently overlooked, simplified, or underestimated” (Portilla *et al.* 2011: 60). This fresh reaction to 1987 conservation regulations is key, and central to USAID’s balance of local and political action.

The following section will outline USAID land management and timber policies implemented in Peru since the FAA was published. By law, these projects must follow Section 118. USAID’s programs, projects, partnerships, and initiatives range in scope from international policy to local grants. In all cases, USAID’s global identity contradicts their rhetoric of local empowerment: they are ultimately motivated by economic development, but they promote ‘building local capacity’ and ‘decentralization’ (USAID 2009). Land conservation also naturally contradicts capitalistic resource extraction, yet these seemingly conflicting concepts are woven into a single environmental agenda in the Amazon. USAID programs at the local level are structured to allocate funding, connect collaborators, and produce quantitative reports. Dialogue between USAID and Amazonian communities should continue to be highlighted. This project specifically concentrates on USAID literature, and lacks local perspective on development

programs. The institution has embedded itself in key ways, through field offices, giving grants, and partnering with other organizations, but the carefully sought after Amazonian can be lost in the shuffle if the institution attempts to be all things to all people.

Illegal logging, ineffective management, and unclear land tenure are key issues in the Peruvian Amazon today (Salisbury 2007). USAID has taken the necessary action of running to the rescue of the Amazon as logging companies threaten to pillage the jungle and its communities. In fact, the United States Congress has recently stipulated no foreign aid can be used to support industrial logging anywhere (Girard 2011). In Peru, reacting to capitalist logging processes with earmarked aid may seem like a contradiction that limits its local support. Overall, deforestation has been drastically reduced and agricultural land simultaneously increased between 1990 and 2007; forest area only dropped 1,602 hectares, according to the World Bank, see Table Two, page 15 (USAID 2010c: 40). Comparatively, between 1981 and 1985 (before FAA Section 118 passed), the Peruvian Amazon lost 270,000 hectares of forest annually (Bedoya and Klein 1996:168). As an international organization, USAID has the luxury of involvement at the national, district and local level, and their mediation between these spheres fosters communication (Melkote & Steeves 2001).


Fluctuation in USAID's budget expenditures result from shifting global priorities, and the United States economy. The current downturn in the U.S. economy impacts USAID's budget. USAID's total budget was cut substantially between 2010 and 2011. Funding for environmental programs dropped from \$370,673,295 to \$56,849,951. Between 2010 and 2011, environmental programs ranked thirteenth of all program budgets. "Health," "protection, assistance and solutions," and "education" topped the list. (Health's substantial budget of \$5,946,790,654 in 2010 was cut to 559,804,325 the following year) (See Table One and Graph One, page 8) (USAID 2010e, USAID 2010c: 153). Peru and its government were not mentioned in the top vendors or top geographic areas receiving USAID funds. Though environmental programs in Latin America may not diminish in importance over time, program budgets suffer cuts if more pressing foreign policy and economic projects require funding around the world (USAID 2004: 31). Any grassroots USAID initiative is subject to comparison on a global scale. USAID planning is not strictly focused on local outcomes, but also on global dynamics.

Table One: USAID. “Where Does USAID’s Money Go?” 2010

	Fiscal Year 2011	FY2011	Total
3.1 - Health	5,946,790,654	559,804,325	6,506,594,980
5.1 - Protection, Assistance and Solutions	2,672,184,444	728,581,901	3,400,766,345
3.2 - Education	1,133,254,664	56,487,744	1,189,742,408
4.4 - Infrastructure	1,073,873,676	69,966,996	1,143,840,672
4.5 - Agriculture	1,005,876,872	103,190,235	1,109,067,107
2.2 - Good Governance	1,018,340,191	55,522,405	1,073,862,597
3.3 - Soc. & Econ Services & Protection for Vulnerable Populations	698,371,132	169,742,214	868,113,346
4.3 - Financial Sector	827,837,698		827,837,698
6.2 - Administration and Oversight	628,796,374	86,180,828	714,977,201
1.6 - Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation	495,207,296	76,673,672	571,880,968
4.6 - Private Sector Competitiveness	549,655,107	20,985,729	570,640,836
1.4 - Counter-Narcotics	425,882,443	8,158,999	434,041,442
4.8 - Environment	370,673,295	56,849,951	427,523,246
2.4 - Civil Society	383,573,060	26,055,747	409,628,807
2.1 - Rule of Law and Human Rights	271,917,838	19,008,227	290,926,065
2.3 - Political Competition and Consensus-Building	237,141,602	40,471,727	277,613,330
4.7 - Economic Opportunity	247,971,929	28,990,115	276,962,044
4.1 - Macroeconomic Foundation for Growth	248,917,156	22,486,147	271,403,303
6.1 - Program Design and Learning	184,114,064	9,581,732	193,695,795
4.2 - Trade and Investment	162,952,106	7,559,431	170,511,537

Graph One: USAID. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Social and Economic Indicators.” 2010, page 156.**U.S. Economic Assistance to Selected LAC Sector Categories**

billions of 2008 \$US



Involvement in Peruvian timber reform has no significant economic benefit for the United States. Historically, the United States receives the bulk of its mahogany and plywood from Asia and not Latin America (Bedoya & Klein 1996). In Peru, the forestry industry only contributes around one percent to Peru's GNP and timber makes up less than half of this percentage (Bedoya & Klein 1996: 146). If neoliberal growth is the primary motivator of development agents, (Corson 2010, Medina *et al.* 2004), there is no reason for USAID to reform the timber industry. Though Section 118 specifically highlights tropical forest preservation, Peru has received substantial funding for timber reform. In 1980, USAID allocated \$22 million to the Central Selva Resource Management Project; in 2003, \$1.5 million through the President's Initiative Against Illegal Logging; and starting in 2006, \$47 million for implementing the Initiative for Conservation in the Andean Amazon. To understand the context of this funding, and its larger goals, it will be put in broader context: How does USAID articulate reality in Peru, and how does it articulate growth and success?

Examining economic development indicators in Peru may distill social processes, but an economic focus articulates USAID's perceptions. A 2010 USAID report, obtaining data from The Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., suggests Peru enjoys relative "economic freedom," defined as "the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services" (USAID 2010c). Peru has an overall score of 68 out of 100 with 100 being "most free." Peru scored over 60 in all categories in 2010 *except* for "property rights" (with a score of 40) and "corruption," (score of 36). Chile and Uruguay are the only two South American countries with scores over 50 in these two categories (see Table Four, page 20). Improving these two indicators in Peru necessitates involvement in the timber industry. Property rights and corruption, though framed as economic, truly involve politics, civil society, kinship relations, and local governance (Salisbury 2007). USAID's focus on funding Amazonian grassroots NGO's with land management programs allows interaction with local processes, then distilled into a reportable economic measure (Girard 2011). Peru's annual allocations for development aid are determined in context with the global political economy.

The United States economy, USAID's fluctuating budget, and USAID's comparative global priorities impact the quantity and distribution of USAID's yearly budget in Peru. Though evaluating Peru's budget may provide some insight into USAID's goals, there are many political factors causing aid fluctuations. From 2000 to 2010, USAID aid to Peru dropped from 112

million dollars to 80.62 million dollars (usaid.gov). Peru has received eight percent of the total aid to Latin America and the Caribbean in the ten years from 1998-2008 (USAID 2010c:165); only Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia, and Columbia received more over the same ten-year span. Since 2001, the United States has been the top distributor of aid in South America; currently followed by Spain, Germany, and Canada. From 1998-2008, the United States has been responsible for 32.6 percent of Peru's international development assistance (USAID 2010c:190), followed by Japan with twenty percent and Spain with thirteen percent. The European Commission was the only multilateral institution with more than 2 percent of aid assistance to Peru from 1998-2008 (USAID 2010c). The United States plays a significant role in Peruvian development projects.

The Peruvian government has also seen land as an expendable resource, especially under the leadership of President Fernando Belaunde (Southgate 1995:2); his economic agenda for the Amazon led to an early partnership with USAID. In 1980, an extensive infrastructure program called, Pichis-Palazú Special Project (PPSP) began as Belaunde started his second run as president following the end of a dictatorship in Peru (Southgate 1995:2). PPSP would be involved in building the timber industry and settling 150,000 Peruvians on Amazonian land (Southgate 1995:2). With USAID's interest in economy and democracy, the circumstances fit neatly with the agency's mission and they agreed to help finance the program (Southgate 1995:3).

USAID chose to give \$22 million to the Central Selva Resource Management Project, because locals and academics alike had strong opposition to the settlement project; CSRMP focused strictly on land management and timber extraction (Southgate 115: 4). The project worked to develop extraction methods sensitive to the jungle ecosystem (though collaboration with Tropical Science Center in Costa Rica), and involved locals in implementing the program. Though these important aspects of the program model were considered, the CSRMP timber projects did not make a profit in 1991. Average revenues were \$5,491.83 per hectares, while extraction costs totaled \$5,614.89 (Southgate 1995:6). Thoughtful and deliberately considering the role of the ecosystem and the community in timber extraction was more costly than operations run by private companies in nearby areas (Southgate 1995:7).

USAID rightly avoided creating dependency by leaving Peruvians to run the program, (Freier 1970) but the locals were left to implement a project they did not design. Cooperation

with private companies would lead to the most sustainable industry, but communities like Yanasha targeted by NGO's are too small and untrained to be a practical labor investment for private companies (Southgate 1995:11). USAID learned from their partnership with CSRMP policy changes regarding international trade would be necessary for small logging companies to make a profit from exporters (Southgate 1995). In order for processes that are sustainable at the local level to continue, USAID must make them functional at the national level as well. By implementing a capitalistically inefficient program, USAID justified to proponents of economic development the need for private timber companies, and may have communicated to Amazonians the benefits of illegal logging, and contributed to the destructive system USAID is combating in the Amazon today.

“Peace and Security, Governing Justly and Democratically, Investing in People, and Economic Growth” are the highlighted objectives of the 2009 Peru Budget Report (USAID 2009). “Sustainable forest management” is mentioned as a specific economic goal in Peru (USAID 2009: 3). The allocation for environmental protection is the third highest of any country in the region between 2002-2008 at 115.6 million dollars, behind only Brazil and Ecuador (USAID 2010c; see Table Five, page 21). Environmental projects and counter narcotics initiatives are two of USAID's biggest priorities in Peru currently (Girard 2011). Though the FAA and the United States Congress place stipulations on how environmentally earmarked money can be spent, USAID works to incorporate the Amazonian perspective into USAID policy (Girard 2011).

In the 2011 USAID Report on Section 118 and 119, a section outlining the region's biodiversity is complimented by a section on the region's cultural diversity (Portilla, *et al.* 2011: 17). There are 59 ethnic groups in the most ethnically diverse region of the Amazon, and USAID identifies 1,200 Amazonian communities still do not have titles to their land (Portilla, *et al.* 2011: 17). USAID cites Chapin when describing this injustice. Chapin sharply criticized international development's treatment of indigenous peoples (Chapin 2004).

High cultural diversity found the Peruvian Amazon is linked to biodiversity.... indigenous people have an important role to play in the past, present, and future of Amazonian ecosystems. Unfortunately indigenous people tend to be marginalized by the decision-making process concerning the establishment and management of these areas. Indeed, conservation NGO and government initiatives make an effort to include indigenous people, as well as other stakeholders, in the decision-making process. However, current debates indicate that in many cases the inclusion of indigenous people is superficial (Portilla, *et al.* 2011: 17).

Here, USAID proves it sees the human communities as part of tropical forest. The “Prodescentralización” program launched by USAID and the Peruvian government in August 2008 aims to improve relationships between district government and its communities. It has been allotted nine million dollars to run for four years (Chirinos et al 2010). The ‘demands’ of community members at the local level are not being met, and USAID hopes to enable local governments to respond to their own communities and encourage civic participation (Chirinos et al 2010). The program highlights training local government staff, focusing on management skills, including financing budgets.

USAID promoted policy interests by funding an initiative by International Center for Non Profit Law (ICNL) and the Peruvian government to pass a bill to protect grassroots NGO’s in 2009. The *Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional* uses financial audits to penalize organizations whose agendas contradict that of the Peruvian government (Pact Inc & ICNL 2002: 9). Bill 2666 would create a ‘civil society regulatory body’ to represent the interests of NGO’s at the national level. The ICNL met with “Peru’s Embassy to the United States” to better understand their interests in terms of NGO management (Pact Inc & ICNL 2002: 9). The political climate in Peru conflicts with this interest, and favors tighter restraint of civil society initiatives (Pact Inc & ICNL 2002: 9). Though USAID’s agenda may seem distanced from local processes, as a third party in Peru’s civil society, they can also facilitate communication between the local and national level: here they required the expertise of a more specialized institution to facilitate communication. The NGO bill does not apply directly to timber reform, but much of USAID’s environmental work in Peru involves overseeing NGO’s implementation of grant money (Girard 2011).

In 2011, a new Forestry and Wildlife Law passed in Peru with significant input from the public, thanks to a year and half of public consultations arranged with help from USAID (Girard 2011). Many of USAID’s recommendations regarding forestry policy involve building Peruvian government capacity and encouraging the public and government to communicate actively (Portilla *et al.* 2010). USAID notes, “USAID efforts on conservation and adequate management of natural resources are yet to be sustainable if the GOP does not address the rule of law and establish an efficient sanctioning process. Strengthening the government effectiveness to provide services and achieve accountability needed of national and regional public organizations will help to promote a constructive dialogue while promoting transparency” (Portilla *et al.* 2010).

Towards this end, USAID supported INRENA's efforts to certify timber, and funded research regarding effectiveness of enforcement of timber regulations (Portilla *et al.* 2010: 69).

USAID did not keep the results of this research to itself, but worked with the Peruvian government to "evaluate its concession process in 2005" (Portilla *et al.* 2010). There are several weaknesses with the new process for distributing concessions, according to USAID (Portilla *et al.* 2010). Outdated maps indicated incorrect land boundaries for some concessions, and the timing of land distribution in the Madre de Dios area meant communities missed out on ideal harvest time (Portilla *et al.* 2010: 67). USAID prioritizes forming strong relationships with the Peruvian Environmental Ministry (Girard 2011) in order to change injustices in timber regulation, and they are also working on the ground to implement new management strategies.

USAID's Initiative for the Conservation of the Andean Amazon, or ICAA, is helping Amazonians become actors in the process of re-imagining their environment. ICAA began in 2006 when the regional bureau saw increasing infrastructure and resource extraction projects in the Amazon as a potential threat to the region (Management 2010). The program was originally conceived as the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, and USAID completed a nine-month design phase to determine needs and resources in the area. Importantly, this program cuts across national political boundaries and includes the majority Andean Amazon region, including portions in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia. USAID's flexible program structure facilitates the creation of targeted initiatives that pull from diverse social resources to solve a social problem.

USAID's experience with CSRMP land management programs in the 1990's informed ICAA's structure. USAID knew a land tenure program required both management and industrial sense. Based on the needs and the resources in the area, ICAA is divided into five pertinent topical consortiums. Conserving the Madidi-Manu Landscape of Boliva and Peru (MMCC), Indigenous Landscapes (IL), Strengthening Environmental Management in Madre de Dios, Peru and Pando, Boliva (M-P), Sustainable Livelihoods in the Western Amazon (SL), and the Secretariat (Management 2010). Each of the first four initiatives are partnered with a international or academic institution, and the fifth is USAID's management hub within the program. The ICAA program allocated \$47 million dollars from USAID over five years, and will be renewed for another five years at the end of the year 2011 (Management 2010). Their

measures of success in program implementation are illustrated in Table Two, page 15. This set of benchmarks both conserves space and builds capacity of Amazonians.

ICAA's structure allows for USAID to implement programs that are closer to local people, but does funding also flow down to the local level? Corson (2010: 580) found during fieldwork with timber management projects in Latin America that development money (perhaps including USAID's budget) moves from public, to private, to non-profit spheres without being distributed at the local level. Conversely, the IL consortium in Peru is working to help indigenous groups gain rights to land, and at midterm were recommending civic federations heighten their awareness of the management process, so they are more able to self-identify solutions to land management problems (Management 2010). The SL consortium certifies local products, including coffee, cacao, and timber. Certifying these resources requires more initial cost than ICAA anticipated (Management 2010). The Rainforest Alliance receives eighty five percent of funding for the SL consortium, and in the long run, "certification provides other benefits to producers – such as better access to markets – that significantly outweigh those costs" (Management 2010). Though budgets *are* moved between institutions and organizations, a multi-directional flow of money brings the budget closer to directly addressing land management problems on the ground.

ICAA was evaluated at the end of Phase One by Management Systems International, an independent international development firm managing more than seventy projects around the world (msiworldwide.com). The program is behind in meeting many of the benchmarks they planned to achieve by the end of Phase One (see Table Two, page 15). Recommendations of the Phase One report were taken seriously and led to concrete management changes within the USAID South American Environment management. For example, recommendations were made for the program to be managed by an officer based in the Peru office (Girard 2011; Management 2010: vii, 22), and in fact, the Regional Environmental Officer for South America is now based in Lima, Peru rather than Washington, D.C. (Girard 2011).

Table Two: ICAA Program Indicators and Four Year Progress*

	<i>ICAA Five-Year Goals</i>	<i>Achievement 2007-2010</i>
1. Hectares of land under improved management	3,358,358	3,116,424
2. Hectares of 'biologically significant land' under better management	3,027,431	1,937,376
3. People Trained	36,072	14,256
4. Policies Implemented	133	57
5. Public Dialogues Given	181	238
6. New Funds Raised	\$250,000	\$3,339,015

* Source: USAID 2010b

USAID's policy is evaluated based on the agenda of other actors. Their extensive partnerships with Peruvian groups must be justified by national, and international, standards (Girard). Other agencies besides USAID have articulated categories of development progress and completed data collection. The 2010 "Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data" report compiles data from several other think tanks and institutions including the World Bank. When other organizations plan development research projects, collaboration is improved. Collaboration could also limit the incorporation of USAID's fieldwork into global norms regarding timber policy. The Millennium Development Goals have created close collaboration between development institutions towards reaching eight specific goals to reduce poverty by 2015 (un.org). This group effort requires institutional transparency and shared project goals (worldbank.org). But, global consistency reduces local NGO's in the Peruvian Amazon to doing work that doesn't apply to their situation.

While USAID has extensive field offices and local support systems, understanding the effectiveness of programs requires documentation. For Amazonian NGO's, documentation may take valuable time away from more important projects in the community. "Peruvian organizations labored to satisfy USAID's detailed, and at times unrealistic, accounting process and suffered sudden and unpredictable withdrawals of funds" (Salisbury 2007: 306). USAID's commitment to the Millennium Development Goals implies their commitment to global development standards. Critics in the field give Amazonian reactions to USAID's management important attention. USAID's global and local position is valuable because it uses both ground-level programs and national policy input to slowly effect long-term change in illegal logging

practices, deforestation, and neglect of Amazonian communities (Girard 2011). Monitoring local processes provides insight into long-term structural improvement and social justice for Amazonian communities.

USAID aims to quantify subjective social situations through data reports. USAID knows “those who authentically commit themselves to the people must re-examine themselves constantly” (Freire 1970: 60). USAID data reports allow for important comparisons between countries, but assert an agenda of productivity and constant improvement. Though the goal is to maintain forests and land in its current state, processes to reach this goal call for constant improvement and increased efficiency. USAID is held accountable to the United States government and thus its reports are highly articulate regarding progress. Evidence of an effectively used budget is economic growth. This measure of success, while logically quantifiable, may also cause USAID to hide project failures. One community member in Vaca Diez, Bolivia, is frustrated that an NGO timber management program denies its shortcomings to the public (Medina *et al.* 2009: 756). Though it is not known whether this project was funded by USAID, the institution could be motivated to value both international and national scrutiny over local scrutiny, thus sacrificing civil society at the local level for political relationships at the global level.

The development agent asked me to talk about how the management was progressing. There were around 150 people in the room, including the press. I started by saying that the policies which were being implemented were good. But the management is not as good as it was presented here. We have been working for four years and have not yet received a cent in payment. ... I regret becoming involved in this initiative. (Medina *et al.* 2009: 756).

USAID is well suited to connect related timber initiatives, communicate local problems to the national level, and train management staff. Though monitoring and evaluating is unavoidable for an institution funded by the United States government, USAID must remain as loyal to Amazonians as to American taxpayers.

What is USAID trying to achieve by holding local NGO’s accountable to specific standards? Their perceptions of space and local identity give insight into their goals. In 2010, Peru had an Environmental Performance Index of 69 (on a range from 0-100 with 100 being the best) (USAID 2010c). This score rates a country’s ability to “[reduce] environmental stresses on human health, and... [promote] ecosystem vitality and sound natural resource management” (USAID 2010c). Peru has a “Biodiversity and Habitat” score of 53 (which includes “biome protection, critical habitat protection, and marine protected areas”), and a perfect “Agriculture”

score (which includes “agricultural water intensity, agricultural subsidies, and pesticide regulation” (USAID 2010c)) of 100, according to the Yale Center for Environmental Health. By the numbers, conservation of land in Peru is increasing, and 318 concessions totaling five million hectares have been distributed since 2003, (USAID 2004:53). Amazonian communities are diverse and difficult environments to implement development projects, and USAID is incorporating a complex political and cultural climate into conservation of tropical forests in the Amazon.

Table Three: USAID. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data” Report. 2010, page 38.

	Agricultural Area											
	Land Area		Total		Permanent Pasture		Arable Land		Permanent Crops		Forest Area	
	2008	1999	2007	1997	2005	1999	2007	1997	2005	1990	2007	
Argentina	273,669	128,680	133,350	99,900	99,850	27,800	32,500	1,015	1,005	35,262	32,721	
Bolivia	108,330	36,999	36,828	33,831	34,512	3,000	3,609	171	206	62,795	58,200	
Brazil	845,942	260,759	263,500	194,266	197,000	57,700	59,500	7,560	7,600	520,027	471,492	
Chile	74,380	15,060	15,762	12,925	12,930	1,800	1,294	315	365	15,263	16,236	
Colombia	110,950	45,668	42,436	40,825	38,944	2,536	1,998	1,718	1,609	61,439	60,634	
Ecuador	27,684	8,075	7,412	5,008	4,990	1,610	1,195	1,395	1,214	13,817	10,458	
Paraguay	39,730	20,083	20,400	19,960	19,960	2,950	4,300	85	98	21,157	18,118	
Peru	128,000	21,110	21,560	16,906	17,000	3,650	3,700	510	610	70,156	68,554	
Uruguay	17,502	14,911	14,683	13,520	13,543	1,350	1,350	43	42	905	1,545	
Venezuela	88,205	21,633	21,350	18,240	18,240	2,593	2,650	803	800	52,026	47,138	
South America	1,714,392	572,978	577,281	455,381	456,969	104,989	112,096	13,615	13,549	852,847	785,095	

V. Conclusion

USAID creates dialogue between remote Amazonian communities subject to a repressive timber industry, and the Peruvian government. Local communities best understand the spatial distribution of forest concessions, and social relationships involved in the system (Medina *et al.* 2009: 755). The Peruvian government does not currently have the capacity to implement enforcement of national timber law, and USAID hopes to provide tools for the Peruvian government to build its capacity (Chirinos *et al.* 2010), and one day fairly distribute land to the 300,000 indigenous residents of the Amazon on its own. To a USAID Regional Environmental Advisor in Peru, “at the end of the day, development is about trying to put yourself out of the job” (Girard 2011). Though USAID is moving toward more sustainable land tenure in the Amazon, there is continued need for development aid. As USAID raises the voices of

indigenous and oppressed Amazonians to the Peruvian government, it proves it is willing to muddle a quantitative political analysis with qualitative and complicated social context. USAID must negotiate the goals of the FAA, U.S. Congress, the Peruvian Government, and local NGO's regarding land tenure in the Peruvian Amazon. Ultimately, USAID works to incorporate Amazonians into their tropical environment, and into civil society. Though Amazonians have a right to these spaces, admittance requires bureaucratic legitimacy, a tool USAID provides.

Additional Tables

Appendix A: *Foreign Assistance Act, Part I, Section 118 - Tropical Forests, Part C, 1986* “Assistance to Developing Countries. In providing assistance to developing countries, the President shall do the following:”

- (1) Place a high priority on conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests.
- (2) To the fullest extent feasible, engage in dialogues and exchanges of information with recipient countries--
 - (A) Which stress the importance of conserving and sustainably managing forest resources for the long-term economic benefit of those countries, as well as the irreversible losses associated with forest destruction, and
 - (B) Which identify and focus on policies of those countries which directly or indirectly contribute to deforestation.
- (3) To the fullest extent feasible, support projects and activities--
 - (A) Which offer employment and income alternatives to those who otherwise would cause destruction and loss of forests, and
 - (B) Which help developing countries identify and implement alternatives to colonizing forested areas.
- (4) To the fullest extent feasible, support training programs, educational efforts, and the establishment or strengthening of institutions which increase the capacity of developing countries to formulate forest policies, engage in relevant land-use planning, and otherwise improve the management of their forests.
- (5) To the fullest extent feasible, help end destructive slash-and-burn agriculture by supporting stable and productive farming practices in areas already cleared or degraded and on lands which inevitably will be settled, with special emphasis on demonstrating the feasibility of agroforestry and other techniques which use technologies and methods suited to the local environment and traditional agricultural techniques and feature close consultation with and involvement of local people.
- (6) To the fullest extent feasible, help conserve forests which have not yet been degraded, by helping to increase production on lands already cleared or degraded through support of reforestation, fuelwood, and other sustainable forestry projects and practices, making sure that local people are involved at all stages of project design and implementation.
- (7) To the fullest extent feasible, support projects and other activities to conserve forested watersheds and rehabilitate those which have been deforested, making sure that local people are involved at all stages of project design and implementation.
- (8) To the fullest extent feasible, support training, research, and other actions which lead to sustainable and more environmentally sound practices for timber harvesting, removal, and processing, including reforestation, soil conservation, and other activities to rehabilitate degraded forest lands.
- (9) To the fullest extent feasible, support research to expand knowledge of tropical forests and identify alternatives which will prevent forest destruction, loss, or degradation, including research in agroforestry, sustainable management of natural forests, small-scale farms and gardens, small-scale animal husbandry, wider application of adopted traditional practices, and suitable crops and crop combinations.
- (10) To the fullest extent feasible, conserve biological diversity in forest areas by--
 - (A) supporting and cooperating with United States Government agencies, other donors (both bilateral and multilateral), and other appropriate governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations in efforts to identify, establish, and maintain a representative network of protected tropical forest ecosystems on a worldwide basis;
 - (B) whenever appropriate, making the establishment of protected areas a condition of support for activities involving forest clearance or degradation; and
 - (C) helping developing countries identify tropical forest ecosystems and species in need of protection and establish and maintain appropriate protected areas.
- (11) To the fullest extent feasible, engage in efforts to increase the awareness of United States Government agencies and other donors, both bilateral and multilateral, of the immediate and long-term value of tropical forests.
- (12) To the fullest extent feasible, utilize the resources and abilities of all relevant United States Government agencies.
- (13) Require that any program or project under this chapter significantly affecting tropical forests (including projects involving the planting of exotic plant species)--
 - (A) be based upon careful analysis of the alternatives available to achieve the best sustainable use of the land, and
 - (B) take full account of the environmental impacts of the proposed activities on biological diversity, as provided for in the environmental procedures of the Agency for International Development.
- (14) Deny assistance under this chapter for--
 - (A) the procurement or use of logging equipment, unless an environmental assessment indicates that all timber harvesting operations involved will be conducted in an environmentally sound manner which minimizes forest destruction and that the proposed activity will produce positive economic benefits and sustainable forest management systems;
 - (B) actions which significantly degrade national parks or similar protected areas which contain tropical forests or introduce exotic plants or animals into such areas.
- (15) Deny assistance under this chapter for the following activities unless an environmental assessment indicates that the proposed activity will contribute significantly and directly to improving the livelihood of the rural poor and will be conducted in an environmentally sound manner which supports sustainable development:
 - (A) Activities which would result in the conversion of forest lands to the rearing of livestock.
 - (B) The construction, upgrading, or maintenance of roads (including temporary haul roads for logging or other extractive industries) which pass through relatively undegraded forest lands.
 - (C) The colonization of forest lands.
 - (D) The construction of dams or other water control structures which flood relatively undegraded forest lands.

Table Four: USAID. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Social and Economic Indicators.” 2010, page 53.

6.4 Economic Freedom														
100=the most free 0=the least free														
	Economic Freedom Scores				Factors of the Economic Freedom Score - 2010									
	2007	2008	2009	2010	Trade Policy	Fiscal Policy	State Intervention	Monetary Policy	Capital Flows	Financial Policy	Labor Policy	Property Rights	Business	Corruption
Bahamas	72	71	70	67	42	95	84	73	30	70	81	70	73	55
Barbados	70	71	72	68	60	70	55	73	45	60	80	80	90	70
Belize	63	63	63	62	71	68	75	76	50	50	82	40	74	29
Cuba	29	28	28	27	62	46	0.0	67	0.0	10	20	10	10	43
Dominica	.	.	63	63	74	68	50	80	65	30	65	65	75	60
Dominican Republic	57	58	59	60	80	85	90	71	55	40	60	30	62	30
Guyana	54	49	48	48	71	56	26	71	30	40	65	35	63	26
Haiti	51	49	50	51	79	82	91	67	30	30	69	10	36	14
Jamaica	65	66	65	66	72	75	62	68	85	60	70	45	87	31
St. Lucia	.	.	69	71	72	73	71	80	55	40	84	70	88	71
St. Vincent and Grenadines	.	.	64	67	73	72	64	71	55	40	78	70	80	65
Suriname	55	54	54	53	66	67	78	68	15	30	85	40	41	36
Trinidad and Tobago	71	70	68	66	82	81	72	69	60	70	78	50	59	36
Caribbean	59	58	60	59	70	72	63	72	44	44	70	47	65	44
Costa Rica	64	64	66	66	82	82	87	68	70	50	59	50	59	51
El Salvador	69	68	70	70	84	86	89	74	75	70	65	50	67	39
Guatemala	60	60	59	61	84	79	94	70	60	50	54	35	53	31
Honduras	59	59	59	58	84	85	74	70	60	60	32	30	63	26
Nicaragua	63	61	60	58	83	78	78	64	55	50	68	25	56	25
Panama	65	65	65	65	76	83	90	73	65	70	41	40	76	34
Central America	63	63	63	63	82	82	85	70	64	58	53	38	62	34
Argentina	54	54	52	51	69	69	76	61	45	30	50	20	62	29
Bolivia	54	53	54	49	77	84	68	63	15	50	39	10	57	30
Brazil	56	56	57	56	69	68	50	76	45	50	57	50	55	35
Chile	78	79	78	77	88	78	90	73	80	70	75	85	65	69
Colombia	60	62	62	65	73	74	75	74	55	60	73	50	84	38
Ecuador	55	55	52	49	72	79	78	64	25	40	42	20	53	20
Paraguay	58	60	61	61	83	97	92	75	65	60	26	30	61	24
Peru	63	64	65	68	85	80	92	82	70	60	66	40	66	36
Uruguay	68	68	69	70	83	82	73	72	75	30	76	75	63	69
Venezuela	48	45	40	37	57	74	62	48	5.0	20	36	0.0	50	19
South America	59	60	59	58	76	79	75	69	48	47	54	38	62	37
Mexico	66	66	66	68	82	84	85	76	65	60	62	50	83	36
LAC	60	60	60	60	75	77	72	71	50	48	61	43	64	39

Table Five: USAID. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic and Social Data” Report. 2010, page 38.

5.1 | Environmental Performance Index - 2010
0-100 higher is better

	EPI Policy Categories								
	Environmental Performance Index	Biodiversity & Habitat	Air Pollution Effects on Ecosystem	Air Pollution Effects on Humans	Climate Change	Environmental Burden of Disease	Agriculture	Water Effects on Ecosystem	Water Effects on Humans
Antigua and Barbuda	70	28	36	97	62	73	55	71	89
Aruba	-	0	33	-	-	-	40	-	100
Bahamas	-	77	49	81	-	63	45	71	97
Barbados	-	0	43	79	-	73	90	31	99
Belize	70	97	51	93	64	58	55	74	62
Bermuda	-	47	34	95	-	-	40	-	-
Cayman Islands	-	59	50	95	-	-	40	-	-
Dominica	-	53	66	82	77	74	48	-	88
Dominican Republic	68	86	52	96	57	55	69	55	84
Grenada	-	22	55	75	74	63	40	-	93
Guyana	59	23	63	84	59	49	57	71	83
Haiti	39	3	69	35	58	30	50	64	18
Jamaica	58	64	42	56	38	70	98	73	84
Netherlands Antilles	-	52	18	79	-	-	40	-	-
St. Kitts and Nevis	-	7	59	97	68	67	92	-	97
St. Lucia	-	52	59	86	75	72	48	-	92
St. Vincent and Grenadines	-	30	58	83	77	66	43	-	-
Suriname	68	74	59	83	64	58	55	69	83
Trinidad and Tobago	54	62	39	55	26	68	93	73	90
Caribbean	60.9	44.0	49.1	80.6	61.4	62.6	57.8	65.3	84.1
Costa Rica	86	73	60	78	79	78	91	74	96
El Salvador	69	18	52	75	76	61	89	75	78
Guatemala	54	48	44	35	55	51	52	80	88
Honduras	50	62	56	52	48	57	52	68	67
Nicaragua	57	60	62	62	51	60	66	71	53
Panama	71	71	45	68	59	70	100	89	79
Central America	64.6	55.5	53.1	61.4	61.1	62.9	75.0	76.0	76.7
Argentina	61	31	48	63	50	72	95	73	92
Bolivia	44	86	65	42	31	42	59	85	56
Brazil	63	61	39	90	46	58	91	86	79
Chile	73	41	42	74	61	79	97	59	92
Colombia	77	83	48	90	71	63	76	69	82
Ecuador	69	83	58	92	55	62	88	74	87
Paraguay	64	59	43	89	52	68	88	57	63
Peru	69	53	43	52	70	61	100	75	70
Uruguay	59	2	60	47	49	70	77	82	100
Venezuela	63	78	39	97	47	68	57	56	84
South America	64.3	57.1	48.5	68.6	55.4	64.2	83.8	71.5	80.5
Mexico	67	51	40	75	56	73	80	60	85
LAC	63.4	49.8	49.3	73.7	59.2	63.5	68.5	69.8	81.6

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